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Abstract 
 
Researchers have addressed many clinician and client attributes in relation to the 
accuracy of judgments made by mental health professionals.  One such moderator 
addressed clinicians’ judgment accuracy in relation to experience.  Contrary to what 
many clinicians expect, a number of studies have failed to demonstrate a positive 
correlation between judgment accuracy and experience (e.g., Berman & Berman, 1984; 
Ruscio & Stern, 2005; Schinka & Sines, 1974).  In Spengler et al. (2009), the relationship 
between judgment accuracy and experience was assessed via a large-scale meta-analysis 
that examined studies of clinical judgment and experience from 1970 to 1996.  The result 
was a small but reliable, homogeneous effect demonstrating a positive correlation 
between judgment accuracy and experience.  The Spengler et al. meta-analysis found 
relatively few significant moderator effects influencing the experience-accuracy effect, 
namely the type of judgment made by clinicians, the criterion validity of accuracy 
measures used, and publication source.  In the present study, results from clinical 
judgment and experience studies from 1997 to 2010 were combined in a meta-analysis.  
An update and extension allowed for cross-validation of the Spengler et al. meta-analysis 
with more recent research as well as an exploration of additional moderator variables, 
such as profession type and inclusion of non-mental health participants.  The overall 
effect was .16, with a 95 percent confidence interval that was above zero (CI = .05 to 
.26).  This overall effect indicated experience significantly impacted judgment accuracy, 
consistent with expectations.  The overall effect was shown to be heterogeneous, 
indicating the Q statistic was sufficiently large to reject the null hypothesis regarding 
homogeneity of the effect size distribution.  Exploratory analyses revealed the presence 
 vi 
of two significant moderator variables, namely judgment type and publication source.  
Limitations included lack of variability of judgment type and difficulty with or complete 
inability to assess other potential moderators of interest, such as feedback and utilization 
of test protocols for the stimulus measure.  Other limitations included utilization of a less 
exhaustive search strategy, in which some relevant studies may have been missed.  
Despite limitations, the results of the present meta-analysis largely replicated those of the 
Spengler et al. meta-analysis.
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
It is generally believed by clinicians in psychology as well as their clients that 
clinical judgments evolve and improve as a result of increased experience.  These 
experiences can consist of more face-to-face time with clients, further training in specific 
skill areas, increased supervision, or even continuing education courses, for example.  
Regardless of the types of experiences obtained, many clinicians and their clients would 
assume these experiences have had a direct impact on clinicians’ abilities to make 
accurate and well-informed clinical judgments, whether those are decisions related to 
diagnosis, prognosis, or intervention choice.  However, clinical judgment research has 
not been completely supportive of a positive correlation between judgment accuracy and 
experience (e.g., Berman & Berman, 1984; Ruscio & Stern, 2005; Schinka & Sines, 
1974).  In these studies, judgment accuracy has not been shown to improve with 
experience, and in some, judgment accuracy has even been shown to worsen with 
experience.  By contrast, other studies have shown a positive correlation between 
experience and judgment accuracy (e.g., Berven, 1985; Brammer, 2002; Rerick, 1999; 
Wilkin, 2001). 
Purpose of the present study 
The present study aimed to clarify the relationship between clinical judgment 
accuracy and experience through an update and extension of the Spengler et al. (2009) 
meta-analysis.  The Spengler et al. meta-analysis examined clinical judgment studies 
between the years 1970 and 1996 to determine whether or not more experience is 
correlated with improved judgment accuracy.  The Spengler et al. meta-analysis was part 
of a more comprehensive project known as the Meta-Analysis of Clinical Judgment 
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project (MACJ; Spengler et al.) in which a comprehensive search strategy was performed 
locating every clinical judgment study within the given time span and entering each study 
into a database for examination.  The Spengler et al. meta-analysis revealed an overall 
effect of .12, indicating a modest, positive relationship between experience and judgment 
accuracy.  The corresponding confidence interval had a lower limit that was greater than 
zero, indicating more experienced clinicians were more accurate in their judgments.  The 
effect in the Spengler et al. meta-analysis was shown to be homogeneous after the 
removal of one outlier study (Garcia, 1993).  Exploratory analyses were conducted to 
assess the impact of moderator variables.  There were very few moderator variables 
shown to have a statistically significant effect, including type of judgment made by 
clinicians, the criterion validity of accuracy measures used, and publication source.  A 
replication and extension of the Spengler et al. meta-analysis allowed for analysis of the 
experience-accuracy effect with more recent research as well as an examination of 
additional moderator variables.  Additionally, the present meta-analysis allowed for a test 
of the robustness of the Spengler et al. findings.  In order to gain perspective on the 
history of clinical judgment research as well as the state of the current research base, 
however, it will be necessary to examine various factors related to the judgment 
accuracy-experience debate, such as how experience and expertise differ, the role of 
cognitive biases and heuristics in clinical judgment, and the specific performance 
differences assumed to be present when novice clinicians are compared to more 
experienced clinicians.  A discussion of the aforementioned factors will be necessary to 
fully understand the complex relationship between clinical judgment and experience.  
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Finally, this chapter provides a rationale for the present study and discusses implications 
of the present study’s findings for the mental health field.  
Experience-expertise distinction 
In order to fully understand the relationship between clinical judgment and 
experience, one must first understand the concept of expertise. Frensch and Sternberg 
(1989) defined expertise as “the ability, acquired by practice and experience, to perform 
qualitatively well in a particular task domain” (p. 189).  This definition cites practice and 
experience as the catalysts for achieving expert status.  However, an experienced 
counselor should not necessarily be considered an expert based on having worked a 
certain number of years in the field (Eells, Lombart, Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005).  
Moreover, increased experience does not necessarily lead to expertise (Eells et al.; Glaser 
& Chi, 1988; Sedlmeier, 2005).   
Although there has been some empirical support for the quality of expert 
judgments being better than those of novices, it has also been noted that experts perform 
tasks differently than novices (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1986; Chan, 2006; Chi, Glaser, & 
Rees, 1982; Ericsson, 2005; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Haerem & Rau, 2007; Hinsley, Hayes, 
& Simon, 1978; Leon & Perez, 2001; Lesgold et al., 1988; Nickerson, Perkins, & Smith, 
1985; O’Reilly, Parlette, & Bloom, 1980; Polanyi, 1962).  Some of these expert 
differences include spending greater amounts of time understanding or analyzing 
problems before attempting solutions, displaying a larger knowledge base, displaying a 
better-organized knowledge base, having the ability to perceive large, meaningful 
patterns in their domain, having greater automatic processing, displaying superior long- 
and short-term memory, having the ability to perceive and represent a problem in their 
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domain at a meaningful level, and displaying more advanced self-monitoring skills 
(Chan; Chi et al.,; Glaser & Chi; Ericsson; Haerem & Rau; Hinsley et al.; Leon & Perez; 
Lesgold et al.; Nickerson et al.; O’Reilly et al.; Polanyi; Sedlmeier, 2005).  According to 
Frensch and Sternberg (1989), however, not all of these differences result in better 
quality judgments for experts.  For example, they indicated the increased ability to 
automatize knowledge and the possession of a larger and more structured knowledge base 
has prevented many experts from outperforming novices on certain tasks.  For example, 
expert clinicians may be able to form cohesive case conceptualizations more rapidly at 
intake; however, the costs of these more organized and automatic processes as compared 
to novices are sometimes reflected in the under emphasis of or failure to identify 
important client data.  Frensch and Sternberg asserted that expert performance was likely 
to be poorer than that of novices when basic-level information or nonintegrated 
information had to be retrieved, when experts were called upon to restructure their 
existing knowledge, and when existing knowledge had to be deliberately or consciously 
selected.  Due to the somewhat subjective and abstract nature of clinical decision-making, 
these demands are likely to occur frequently.  Furthermore, the variability in individual 
clients and their presenting problems make it likely that clinicians will be called upon to 
restructure old knowledge bases and make conscious, newly constructed, and deliberate 
treatment decisions.  The aforementioned cognitive shortcomings of expert clinicians 
noted by Frensch and Sternberg are prevalent in non-mental health professions to varying 
degrees.  The following is a more in-depth investigation of some of the mechanisms 
underlying mental health clinicians’ faulty judgments, specifically biases based on client 
variables and cognitive heuristics.    
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Bias interference on clinical judgment 
Without adding the variable of experience into the equation, research has shown 
that clinicians operate with a degree of personal and professional bias (Agell & 
Rothblum, 1991; Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Biaggio, Roades, 
Staffelbach, Cardinali, and Duffy, 2000; Bowers & Bieschke, 2005; Clavelle & Turner, 
1980; Coutinho, Oswald, Best, & Forness, 2002; Dailey, 1952; Davis-Coelho, Waltz, & 
Davis-Coelho, 2000; Fernbach, Winstead, & Derlega, 1989; Friedlander & Stockman, 
1983; Gauron & Dickinson, 1966; Hansen & Reekie, 1990; Herbert, Nelson, & Herbert, 
1988; Langer & Abelson, 1974; Lewis, Croft-Jeffreys, & David, 1990; McNiel & Binder, 
1995; Mohr, Israel, & Sedlacek, 2001; Neighbors, Trierweiler, Ford, & Muroff, 2003; 
Oskamp, 1965; Pfeiffer, Whelan, & Martin, 2000; Raines & Rohrer, 1955; Richards & 
Wierzbicki, 1990; Rosenhan, 1973; Sandifer, Hordern, & Green, 1970; Snyder, 1977; 
Spengler, 2000; Spengler, Strohmer, Dixon & Shivy, 1995; Strohmer & Leierer, 2000; 
Temerlin, 1968; Teri, 1982; Trachtman, 1971; Wilson, 2000; Whaley, 2001).  In some of 
these studies, clinicians’ judgments of the degree and type of pathology displayed by 
clients were significantly affected by the clients receiving a label of “patient” or “client.”  
In other words, individuals labeled as patients or clients were often viewed as exhibiting 
more pathology than individuals labeled as “normal” with the exact same behaviors or 
characteristics (e.g., Herbert et al.; Langer & Abelson; Snyder, 1977).  Additionally, 
clients’ socioeconomic statuses have been shown to influence clinicians’ judgments.  
Trachtman, for example, found that social class had a significant impact on clinicians’ 
assessment of clients’ Rorschach responses.  The clinicians’ judgments were based upon 
two identical Rorschach protocols with only the social class varied.  Specifically, clients 
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of lower socioeconomic status were rated more negatively by clinicians as compared to 
clients of middle socioeconomic status.  Furthermore, Lopez (1989) found that clinicians 
were negatively biased towards those diagnosed with developmental disabilities and 
members of relatively low socioeconomic status when clinicians were given identical sets 
of client information with only developmental disability and socioeconomic statuses 
varied.   
Other potential sources of bias include client gender, sex-role, race, and age.  For 
example, in some studies, clinicians gave poorer prognoses to females when identical 
case histories were used for both genders (Agell & Rothblum, 1991; Fernbach et al., 
1989; Hansen & Reekie, 1990; Teri, 1982).  Gender bias was especially prevalent when 
clinicians were asked to predict the occurrence of violence.  In other words, violence was 
more likely to be predicted with male clients than female clients (Lewis et al., 1990; Lidz, 
Mulvey, & Gardner, 1993; McNiel & Binder, 1995).  These gender bias studies involved 
providing clinicians with identical case vignettes with only the gender of the client 
varied.  This finding is sometimes dependent, however, on the gender of the clinician.  
Elbogen, Williams, Kim, Tomkins, and Scalora (2001) found that female clinicians 
predicted male psychiatric patients as more dangerous than did male clinicians.  When it 
comes to bias based on clients’ sex-role, clinicians were sometimes found to predict that 
clients who possessed stereotypical traits of their sex had a better prognosis for treatment 
response as compared to clients with identical information who did not possess 
stereotypical sex-role traits.  For example, Rosenthal (1982) found that lesbian clients 
with more stereotypically masculine traits were rated to have poorer treatment prognoses 
than were clients with more stereotypical sex-role traits.  Bias based on race has been 
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especially prevalent in the area of violence prediction.  African-American psychiatric 
inpatients are often predicted by clinicians to be more violent than their Caucasian 
counterparts, for example (Garb, 1998; Hoptman et al., 1999).  Finally, age seemed to 
play a role in clinicians’ judgments of clients.  For example, clinicians were often shown 
to give poorer prognoses to elderly clients compared to middle-aged or younger clients 
with the same case histories (Ford & Sbordone, 1980; Hansen & Reekie, 1990; Hillman, 
Stricker, & Zweig, 1997; James & Haley, 1995; Meeks, 1990; Ray, McKinney, & Ford, 
1987; Ray, Raciti, & Ford, 1985; Settin, 1982; Wrobel, 1993).   
Bias studies such as those described in this section often employ some method of 
establishing a baseline for the particular clinicians’ judgment tendencies.  For example, 
identical case vignettes are often utilized with only the variable of interest manipulated 
(Abramowitz & Dockeki, 1977).  This method allows for comparisons between 
conditions but often does not allow the researcher to conclude whether or not judgment 
errors have occurred.  One of the reasons for this limitation is due to differences in 
population base rates for certain events or conditions.  For example, in studies of gender 
bias for judgments of violence likelihood, researchers are often not able to determine 
whether or not the higher observed likelihood ratings for male clients are due to true bias 
or clinician consideration of higher violence base rates for males (Lewis et al., 1990; 
Lidz, Mulvey, & Gardner, 1993; McNiel & Binder, 1995).  This limitation occurs in 
many studies regarding client variable biases due to the observed differences in base rates 
across populations as well as the lack of a clear-cut standard by which to evaluate 
clinicians’ judgments. 
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In addition to exhibiting bias based on client and clinician demographic or 
personality characteristics, bias has been demonstrated in the form of faulty functioning 
in clinicians’ cognitive processes.  These types of biases, generally referred to as 
cognitive heuristics, include confirmatory bias (Wood & Nezworski, 2005), hindsight 
bias (Belknap, 2000), anchoring and adjustment heuristics (Cioffi, 2001), 
representativeness heuristics (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, Kunda, 1983; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), and the availability heuristic (Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  A more recent 
addition to the previous set of commonly studied heuristics is known as the affect 
heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), which is associated with the 
vividness bias identified by Nisbett and Ross. 
The first type of heuristic mentioned, confirmatory bias, refers to “the tendency to 
seek out information that is consistent with a belief or hypothesis and to ignore or 
overlook information that is potentially inconsistent” (Davies, 2003, p. 736).  One way in 
which confirmatory bias is tested in research studies is through use of the positive test 
strategy. The positive test strategy involves testing a hypothesis by searching for 
instances in which the hypothesized characteristics can be found rather than searching for 
instances in which the hypothesized characteristics would be absent.  For example, 
Kunda, Fong, Sanitioso, and Reber (1993) asked respondents questions such as, “Are you 
happy with your social life?” or “Are you extraverted?”  Respondents tended to reply 
with examples that confirmed rather than contradicted the hypothesized characteristic.  In 
addition, more respondents tended to claim they possessed the hypothesized 
characteristic than respondents who were asked the opposite question.  Confirmatory bias 
has been shown to have an effect on mental health clinicians’ judgments regarding their 
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clients.  Haverkamp (1993) examined 65 counseling trainees’ hypothesis testing 
strategies in response to a videotaped counseling session.  A tendency to exhibit 
confirmatory bias was found among the trainees, with a mean of 64 percent of their 
responses falling in the confirmatory category and only 15 percent labeled as 
disconfirmatory.  Likewise, Strohmer, Shivy, and Chiodo (1990) found confirmatory bias 
to be present in the way clinicians remembered clinical information.  When presented 
with a written report and later asked to remember and select information, clinicians 
tended to remember and select more confirmatory than disconfirmatory information.  
This finding held even when the written report had contained more disconfirmatory 
information.  
Hindsight bias, on the other hand, involves making after-the-fact assessments of a 
particular outcome.  Individuals engaging in hindsight bias have post-hoc knowledge of 
the particular outcomes and claim to have had this knowledge before the outcomes 
occurred.  Research has shown hindsight bias at work in a variety of real-world 
situations, for example in the ability to judge sporting events (Bonds-Raacke, Fryer, 
Nicks, & Durr, 2001).  Hindsight bias has been examined in psychology research and was 
found to be robust across a wide variety of task environments (Ash, 2009).  Slovic and 
Fischhoff (1977), for example, examined hindsight bias in relation to whether or not 
debiasing strategies would improve clinicians’ judgments of the results of a research 
study.  Specifically, they were forced to consider alternatives to the actual results of the 
study.  The clinicians were assigned to either a hindsight or a foresight condition 
depending on whether they were asked to consider alternatives to a hypothetical outcome 
(foresight) or to an already existing outcome (hindsight).  Slovic and Fischhoff found that 
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asking clinicians to consider alternatives resulted in a decrease in the hindsight bias, 
regardless of whether or not they were asked prior to or after the particular outcome.  
Hindsight bias has been partially explained by the use of anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990).  Anchoring and adjustment heuristics 
involve individuals making changes to their initial assessments based on knowledge of 
the true outcomes.  Two types of anchoring and adjustment heuristics have been 
proposed.  The first, expectation-based adjustments, describes how individuals assess 
how surprising they found a given outcome and make adjustments to their retrospective 
judgments in accordance with this information (Müller & Stahlberg, 2007).  Research has 
shown that the more surprising an individual judges an outcome to be, the less likely he 
or she will claim to have been able to judge the outcome in the first place, leading to a 
reverse hindsight bias effect.  However, if an outcome is judged by an individual to be 
predictable, that individual will be at risk of employing hindsight bias.  Therefore, 
surprise has been shown to be negatively correlated with hindsight bias (Ash, 2009).  The 
second type of anchoring and adjustment heuristic, known as the experience-based 
adjustment, describes how individuals adjust their retrospective assessments by using 
their beliefs about their levels of expertise in the given domains.  More specifically, if an 
individual judges himself or herself to be an expert in a particular domain, the individual 
will make a rather small adjustment from the outcome.  Individuals who believe they lack 
experience or expertise in a given domain, however, will most likely make a relatively 
larger adjustment from the outcome.  Therefore, the experience-based adjustment is more 
situation-general than the expectation-based adjustment, which can be described as 
situation-specific (Ash). 
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Representativeness heuristics are yet another type of cognitive bias individuals 
utilize when making judgments.  Representativeness heuristics involve individuals 
making judgments about an object or person by comparing the object or person to another 
and unknowingly invoking relevant schemata.  Representativeness heuristics involve the 
failure to take into account appropriate base rates for the condition or event being 
addressed (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002).  According to Ashcraft (2002), “The 
representativeness heuristic is a judgment rule in which an estimate of the probability of 
an event is determined by one of two features: how similar the event is to the population 
of events it came from or whether the event seems similar to the process that produced it” 
(p. 468).  According to Ashcraft’s description, base rates are either not known or 
dismissed by the clinician.  Mental health clinicians, for example, may employ the 
representativeness heuristic when assigning diagnoses based upon comparisons of the 
clients in question with the prototypical client pertaining to that specific diagnosis 
without taking the appropriate base rates into account.  Garb (1996) tested the 
representativeness heuristic among psychologists and interns by providing them with case 
histories and asking them to rate the likelihood of disorder, confidence in their ratings, 
and how similar they believed the case to be in comparison with the “typical” case 
corresponding with the particular disorder they chose.  Findings revealed a positive 
correlation between likelihood ratings and similarity ratings, indicating clinicians seemed 
to judge the particular cases based on how similar those cases were to the perceived 
prototype of the disorder in question.  According to Garb (1996), clinicians in this 
condition relied upon the representativeness heuristic to form their judgments rather than 
adhering to base rates or criteria based upon the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
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Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychological 
Association, 2000).  Representative heuristics are especially pertinent to the mental 
health field due to the illusiveness and covertness of decision-making processes involved 
(Garb, 1996). 
The availability heuristic refers to the tendency to attend to the data that are most 
readily available (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  When clinicians 
utilize the availability heuristic, they form judgments of clients based upon the most 
readily available clinical data, which is usually the most salient and/or memorable data.  
Much of what we find salient or memorable is influenced by training and/or theoretical 
orientation as well as personal factors.  For example, psychoanalytical clinicians will find 
clients’ early social and emotional development as well as information pertaining to the 
clients’ families of origin to be more useful and salient in case conceptualization than 
would more behaviorally-oriented clinicians.  Psychoanalytically-trained clinicians, in 
comparison with behaviorally-trained clinicians, will also most likely have attended to 
this type of data in a more diligent and overt manner, thus increasing the likelihood of 
remembering the information later.  In addition to differences in the utilization of the 
availability heuristic based upon training and theoretical orientation, clinicians utilize 
their previously established personal schemata for understanding their clients.  
Specifically, clinicians often find client data to be more salient and more memorable 
when the client data are vivid, emotional, amusing, or shocking.  Client data that are 
routine or pallid are often underemphasized or ignored, even though this type of 
information may have been more diagnostically relevant than the more vivid client data 
(Dumont, 1993).  The availability heuristic often plays a role in vocational 
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overshadowing.  Vocational overshadowing occurs when clinicians underemphasize or 
ignore clinically relevant data regarding clients’ professional problems in favor of what 
the clinicians perceive to be more interesting problems in the clients’ personal lives 
(Spengler, 2000).  In relation to the availability heuristic, clinicians may remember 
clients’ personal problems more vividly than vocational problems, thus ignoring 
potentially important vocational data.  
Finally, the affect heuristic, introduced by Slovic et al. (2002), refers to reliance 
on emotions and feeling-states to guide decision-making.  Affect heuristics, like the 
previously mentioned heuristics, operate at varying levels of consciousness.  According 
to dual-process theories of cognition, individuals utilize two fundamentally different 
methods of comprehending reality.  The first is a reliance on analytical, deliberative, and 
verbal means.  The second involves relying on intuitive, experiential, and emotional 
means.  Both can be quite irrational and have the potential of leading to inaccurate 
appraisals and judgments (Epstein, 1994).  In studies of relative risk as perceived by the 
general public, feelings of dread were shown to determine how risky a particular event 
would be.  For example, judges associated radiation exposure from nuclear power plants 
with higher dread and rated this event as far riskier than radiation from medical x-rays.  
However, the likelihood of becoming exposed to radiation from a nuclear power plant is 
much less than that of exposure to radiation from medical x-rays.  Most individuals 
undergo x-rays at some point in their lives and many receive x-rays repeatedly, thus 
increasing their risk for radiation exposure.  However, the participants in Epstein who 
associated radiation exposure from nuclear power plants with higher feelings of dread 
judged that type of radiation exposure as far riskier than radiation exposure from medical 
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x-rays.  Assigning greater risk to events inducing more feelings of dread may lead to an 
overestimation of the actual risk of those events.  In the area of clinical judgment, the 
affect heuristic is believed by Garb (2005) to be of particular importance.  Although not 
yet extensively studied in the clinical judgment research, the affect heuristic has the 
potential to bias clinicians’ initial liking or disliking of clients (especially when based on 
client variables such as race, gender, age), their appraisals of client malingering, and 
attributions of client problems.  The affect heuristic has relevance for vocational 
overshadowing, specifically related to clinicians’ tendencies to be less empathetic 
towards vocational problems (Hill, Tanney, & Leonard, 1977; Melnick, 1975).  
Vocational overshadowing is related to both the affect heuristic as well as the previously 
discussed availability heuristic, which tends to be interrelated.  Since the availability 
heuristic often involves individuals emphasizing or remembering salient information, it is 
logical that salient information tends to be more emotion-laden in nature (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980).  In terms of vocational overshadowing, clinicians may find personal problems to 
be more salient due to the clinicians’ positive affect and empathy towards personal 
problems as compared to vocational problems (Borresen, 1965).  In Spengler, Blustein, 
and Strohmer (1990), counseling psychologists were found to differ in their preferences 
for working with personal problems in comparison to vocational problems.  Findings 
revealed that clinicians with greater preferences for addressing personal problems were 
less likely to assess, diagnose, and treat vocational problems.  These findings provided 
support for the connection between affect and clinical judgment, with clinician 
preferences reflecting, in part, clinicians’ empathy toward and/or positive feelings 
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towards working with personal problems.  The automatic and instinctive processing 
involved in the affective heuristic may lead to inaccurate judgments. 
Biases based on faulty cognitive processes have long been the subjects of research 
studies involving non-clinicians (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007).  However, the examination 
of how certain types of heuristics influence judgment is especially pertinent to the mental 
health field, where the use of heuristics and the presence of bias can have a dramatic 
effect on the course and outcome of treatment (Garb, 1999).  Mental health clinician 
biases can also occur as a result of other types of errors, such as those based on invalid or 
unreliable data, invalid or unreliable instruments, and failing to recognize regression 
towards the mean (Lichtenberg, 1997).  Biases are especially pertinent to this study due 
to their impact on clinical judgment accuracy.  Researchers have long been interested in 
how clinicians are affected by various biases and heuristics and how clinicians’ judgment 
accuracy can be skewed as a result (Garb, 1999).  Although biases and heuristics should 
not be viewed as inherently negative and do not necessarily lead to inaccurate clinical 
judgments, it is generally believed that clinicians are at risk of making inaccurate 
judgments if they are not diligent in developing critical thinking and self-monitoring 
skills.  The automatic nature of most biases and heuristics may prevent clinicians from 
utilizing self-awareness in order to effectively gauge the accuracy of their judgments 
(Hogarth & Karelaia).  The use of biases and heuristics is of special concern in regards to 
more experienced clinicians, who have had more time to cement and automatize their 
clinical judgment practices (Garb & Grove, 2005).  In the next section, the clinical 
judgments of clinicians will be examined as a function of varying levels of experience.  
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Differences in clinical judgment in relation to experience 
In terms of the effects of experience on clinical judgment, much research has 
found novice and experienced clinicians to perform similarly (e.g., Boland, 2002; 
Chandler, 1970; Faust et al., 1988; Garb & Boyle, 2003; Gaudette, 1992; Goldberg, 1959; 
Hickling, Blanchard, Mundy, & Galovski, 2002; Kim & Ahn, 2002; Walker & Lewine, 
1990; Yeo et al., 2001).  Goldberg compared staff psychologists, psychology trainees, 
and untrained secretaries regarding their ability to diagnose brain damage on the basis of 
the Bender-Gestalt Test.  The groups were not found to differ in the accuracy of their 
judgments.  Similarly, Yeo et al. examined generally-trained nurses and psychiatrically-
trained nurses in their diagnostic decision-making of depression, mania, and 
schizophrenia case vignettes.  Judgment accuracy was not shown to differ as a function of 
whether or not nurses had additional psychiatric training.   
Other research has found that more experienced clinicians showed a significant 
improvement in judgment accuracy (e.g., Arkell, 1976; Berven, 1985; Brammer, 2002; 
Garcia, 1993; Rerick, 1999; Wilkin, 2001).  For example, Arkell asked clinicians to 
classify the human figure drawings of functionally normal and maladjusted children.  
Clinicians with more experience were found to more accurate classify the figure human 
drawings than those with less experience.  Wilkin, on the other hand, asked general 
practitioners, pediatricians, and psychologists to provide accurate diagnoses for case 
vignettes portraying clients with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.  Psychologists 
were shown to significantly outperform the other two professional groups, displaying a 
79 percent hit rate, compared to 66 percent and 64 percent for pediatricians and general 
practitioners, respectively.   
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Yet other studies have shown judgment accuracy to worsen with more experience 
(e.g., Berman & Berman, 1984; Falvey, Bray, & Hebert, 2005; Ruscio & Stern, 2005; 
Schinka & Sines, 1974).  For example, Falvey et al. examined varying levels of 
experience in relation to diagnostic accuracy as well as comparing their case 
conceptualization and treatment planning skills.  Twenty practicing clinicians provided 
diagnostic judgments for a standardized case simulation of Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder as well as follow-up explanations of their judgment 
processes.  Not only were more experienced clinicians shown to have superior case 
conceptualization and treatment planning skills as judged by an expert panel, but more 
experienced clinicians provided more accurate diagnoses. 
An examination of the individual clinical judgment studies makes apparent the 
lack of a definitive or clear relation between experience and judgment accuracy.  Due to 
the wealth of clinical judgment accuracy research, it has become apparent to some 
scholars that a different approach is needed to gain a more accurate and complete 
understanding of the experience-accuracy effect (Falvey et al., 2005).  Some have 
conducted traditional narrative reviews in order to determine whether or not there is a 
positive correlation between experience and clinical judgment.  Many narrative reviews 
have concluded that experience does not facilitate better clinical judgments.  For 
example, Wiggins (1973) found there was “little empirical evidence that justifies the 
granting of ‘expert’ status to the clinician on the basis of training, experience, or 
information processing ability” (p. 131).  Similarly, Watts (1980) stated, “There are many 
studies...suggesting that the clinical judgment of psychologists is no better than that of, 
say physical scientists; and that psychologists with clinical training have no better 
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judgment than those without” (p. 95).  Perhaps one of the most important reviews had 
been conducted by the American Psychological Association (1982), from which the 
conclusion was drawn that neither professional training nor experience was related to 
professional competence.  Other reviews have repeated this conclusion (Faust, 1986; 
Faust and Ziskin, 1988; Garb, 1998; Highlen & Hill, 1984; Lichtenberg, 1997).   
Explanations for clinical judgment findings 
It is important to understand not only the relationship between clinical judgment 
and experience but also the reasons why many studies have shown that clinical judgment 
does not improve with increased experience.  There are many reasons why this may be in 
addition to the cognitive biases discussed earlier.  Dawes (1994) discussed some of these 
reasons.  First, he asserted that clinicians often treat the process of gaining clinical 
experience as if it were identical to the process of gaining other types of experiences, 
such as learning motor skills.  Many types of skills are learned somewhat automatically 
through repetitive practice.  However, clinical judgment requires complex cognitive 
processes.  Perhaps the most crucial difference is the lack of immediate feedback when 
clinicians make clinical decisions as opposed to the often naturalistic feedback that 
occurs with learning other skills.  Without this feedback, clinicians run the risk of 
committing subsequent errors, a costly occurrence given the importance of accurate 
clinical judgment (Garb, 2005).  Clinical skill learning can be categorized as experiential 
learning, in which the clinician learns by doing.  In order for experiential learning to be 
successful, however, two conditions must be met: a) a clear understanding of what 
constitutes an incorrect response or error in judgment; and b) immediate, unambiguous, 
and consistent feedback when such errors are made.  Unfortunately, these two conditions 
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are rarely met in the actual practice of psychology (Dawes; Garb, 2005; Lichtenberg, 
1997; Zeldow, 2009).   
Differences in performance of experienced and novice clinicians 
Some research has supported the claim that novices and experienced clinicians 
perform differently.  For example, experienced clinicians have been shown to differ from 
novice clinicians on a number of important cognitive dimensions, such as the complexity 
of knowledge structures, short- and long-term memory, efficiency in client 
conceptualization, number of concepts generated, flexibility in therapeutic response, and 
the quality of their cognitive schemata regarding case material (Brammer, 2002; 
Cummings, Hallberg, Martin, Slemon, & Hiebert, 1990; Eells et al., 2005; Kim & Ahn, 
2002; Kivlighan & Quigley, 1991; Martin, Slemon, Hiebert, Hallberg, & Cummings, 
1989; Mayfield, Kardash, & Kivlighan, 1999; Mumma & Mooney, 2007; O’Byrne & 
Goodyear, 1997; Tracey, Hays, Malone, & Herman, 1988).  Additionally, experienced 
clinicians have been shown to be able to employ statistical heuristics more effectively 
when statistical heuristics are deemed as being important by the clinicians (Nisbett et al., 
1983).  Although it may be reassuring to some in the field that novice and experienced 
clinicians have been shown to differ on these cognitive dimensions, researchers have 
warned against reaching positive conclusions.  For example, Martin et al. (1989) 
examined how novice and experienced clinicians differed on the extensiveness of their 
therapeutic conceptualizations and found, “Experienced clinicians conceptualized the 
specific problems of their individual clients in relation to their conceptual structures for 
counseling in general” (p. 399).  In other words, more experienced clinicians tended to 
rely on their previously established schemata regarding the general counseling process 
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with minor adjustments according to the needs of each case.  Novices, on the other hand, 
were found to require considerably more client-specific concepts in order to form their 
conceptualizations of the individual clients and their problems.  The more experienced 
clinicians’ greater automaticity in case conceptualization resulted in greater error in 
clinical judgment, consistent with experience-based adjustment models (Schwarz & 
Stahlberg, 2003). 
The previous paragraphs outlined the variability in clinical judgment accuracy 
findings in relation to experience.  Through an examination of individual studies as well 
as traditional narrative reviews in this research area, it is apparent that the relation 
between judgment accuracy and experience is not clear.  This is especially alarming 
given the frequent demands on clinicians to make accurate judgments, for example when 
conducting psychological assessments, establishing appropriate course of treatment, and 
the reporting of diagnostic impressions to third parties for reimbursement.  In addition, 
the variability in experience-accuracy findings is worrisome given the amount of time, 
effort, and money contributing to training of clinicians both in their early careers as well 
as throughout (Spengler et al., 2009). 
Purpose and rationale for present study 
 Until recently, individual studies as well as traditional narrative reviews have 
comprised the research base regarding clinical judgment and experience.  Individual 
studies have revealed mixed findings and traditional narrative reviews, for the most part, 
have found clinical judgment does not improve with experience.  Recently, however, the 
large-scale Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis synthesized the clinical judgment and 
experience research from the years 1970 to 1996.  Spengler et al. combined results from 
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75 clinical judgment studies including the judgments of 4,607 clinicians and found a 
small, reliable effect, demonstrating a positive correlation between experience and 
judgment accuracy.  They noted a 13 percent increase (d = .12) in clinicians’ decision-
making accuracy with more experience, with few significant effects from moderator 
variables.  Spengler et al. noted that even though the overall effect found was modest, it 
was not trivial.  They asserted the overall effect was reliable since the confidence interval 
did not cross zero and few moderator variables significantly impacted the overall effect.  
When compared with meta-analysis findings analyzing the relation between experience 
and client outcome (Lambert & Ogles, 2004), the Spengler et al. experience-accuracy 
effect is meaningful.  As Spengler et al. stated, “meta-analytic reviews of psychotherapy 
find little evidence for a relation between experience and client outcome” p. 26).  In a 
reaction to Spengler et al., Ridley and Shaw-Ridley described the meta-analysis findings 
as “sobering and instructive” (p. 402, 2009).  They addressed the Spengler et al. findings 
in light of the effort and funds contributed to the establishment of professional training 
and safeguards, specifically addressing the utilization of rigorous accreditation programs 
designed to promote clinician competency and effectiveness.  According to Ridley and 
Ridley-Shaw, the marginal improvement in clinical judgment accuracy as a function of 
greater experience has serious implications for clients, namely the adherence to 
premature and/or inaccurate case formulations, the consequent selection of inappropriate 
or ineffective intervention strategies, and the inaccurate appraisal of client outcomes. 
The Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis provided an in-depth, comprehensive 
analysis of the relation between experience and judgment accuracy, examining various 
moderator variables that may have impacted the overall effect.  The purpose of the 
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present study is to conduct a meta-analysis in order to investigate whether or not clinical 
judgment improves with experience, updating and expanding upon the work of Spengler 
et al.  The Spengler et al. meta-analysis addressed studies conducted between 1970 and 
1996.  An update and extension will allow for cross-validation of the Spengler et al. 
meta-analysis and an examination of whether or not findings vary as a function of using 
current research.  Due to the presence of only one available meta-analysis examining the 
experience-judgment accuracy effect, cross-validation of this meta-analysis will be a 
beneficial contribution to the clinical judgment research.  An update will also provide a 
test of robustness of the Spengler et al. findings using current research.  
In the present study, like in the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, experience 
encompassed both clinical experience and educational training.  Clinical experience was 
defined as the time clinicians spend directly providing services to clients.  Educational 
training, in contrast, represented the level of graduate training clinicians have reached as 
well as training in specific skill areas or the receipt of supervision.  Clinical judgments in 
the present study encompassed a variety of decisions commonly made by clinicians in 
professional practice.  For example, clinicians are often called upon to make 
determinations of diagnosis, prognosis, behavior prediction, and intervention choice.  The 
different methods of assessing judgment accuracy reflected varying degrees of criterion 
validity.  Some methods of assessing judgment accuracy included a priori validation of 
stimulus materials, comparison of judgments with observable client behaviors, expert 
consensus, and comparisons of judgments with psychological test scores.  Brammer 
(2002), for example, provided clinicians with a computer-based case vignette and 
subsequently asked the clinicians to provide a DSM-IV diagnosis.  Judgment accuracy 
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was then determined by a panel of “expert” judges, consisting of four psychologists with 
an average of 18 years of licensed, clinical experience.  The judges were provided with a 
list of 30 possible diagnoses and were asked to rate the clinicians’ diagnoses on a 4-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from unlikely to definite.  Consistent with the Spengler et al. 
(2009) meta-analysis, studies in which judgment accuracy was determined via various 
types of professional consensus were considered to have low criterion validity due to the 
relatively subjective nature of the method for determining judgment accuracy. 
It is interesting to note that although included studies addressed whether or not 
experience was correlated with greater judgment accuracy, some of the studies employed 
“experienced” or “expert” clinicians as assessors of judgment accuracy.  The use of 
clinicians with more experience as judges for determining other clinicians’ judgment 
accuracy casts doubt on the ability of these more experienced judges to make accurate 
assessments, especially considering the varied research findings regarding the 
experience-accuracy effect.  Kirk and Hsieh (2004) alluded to the problem of using more 
experienced judges’ assessments as validation for less experienced clinicians.  Kirk and 
Hsieh found that when clinicians of varying levels of experience were asked to provide a 
diagnosis for a case vignette, there was a 50-50 split between the selection of two 
different diagnoses.  They noted, “This is troubling because the judgments of experienced 
clinicians, such as those in this study, are used in many reliability studies as the 
‘validating diagnosis’ or the ‘gold standard’ against which other diagnostic methods are 
compared for accuracy” (p. 8).  Therefore, using professional consensus as a method of 
validating clinicians’ judgment accuracy presents a major problem in clinical judgment 
research. 
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 More valid ways of determining judgment accuracy than using professional 
consensus have been found in the clinical judgment research.  For example, higher 
criterion validity can be found when the accuracy of clinicians’ judgments is assessed 
based on such measures as those used in Ogloff and Daffern (2006).  In this study, 
psychiatric nurses’ predictions of patients’ violence were compared to the patients’ actual 
violence as recorded on the Overt Aggression Scale (OAS) by a second set of nurses.  
Steps were taken to enhance the accurate recording of ratings on the OAS, such as 
providing training and support for the second set of nurses and requiring them to rate 
incidents of violence either right after it occurred or at the end of their shifts. This type of 
standard by which to measure judgment accuracy reflects a higher level of criterion 
validity than does professional consensus; however, error can still occur.  For example, 
error in the Ogloff and Daffern study may have occurred in the form of variability in 
nurses’ observations and reporting of violence.  The studies included in the present meta-
analysis employed a variety of assessment methods for determining clinicians’ judgment 
accuracy.  Criterion validities (high versus low) were determined for each assessment 
method. 
Clinical judgment studies in which judgment accuracy cannot be determined will 
be excluded.  This includes many studies of clinician bias.  Although bias often plays a 
role in clinicians’ judgment accuracy, it will be impossible to determine accuracy in some 
cases.  In other words, clinicians may display bias towards members of a given race, age 
group, or gender but may or may not be able to formulate accurate judgments with those 
groups.  It is often difficult to determine judgment accuracy in these cases due to a lack of 
a standard by which to evaluate the judges’ decisions. For example, Mohr, Weiner, 
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Chopp, and Wong (2009) presented mental health clinicians of varying experience levels 
with identical case vignettes involving clients of either heterosexual, bisexual, or 
homosexual orientation.  The purpose of the study was to determine whether clinician 
bias exists in relation to client differences in sexual orientation.  Moreover, the authors 
were interested in determining the conditions under which the most bias occurred, 
specifically examining whether or not there was an increase in clinician bias when the 
client vignettes included stereotypes about bisexuality or homosexuality.  The clinicians 
were asked to rate the clients’ GAF scores based on the information provided in the 
vignettes.  Results revealed bias in the way clinicians viewed clients based on their 
sexuality, especially when the vignettes included stereotypical information about 
sexuality.  Although the results revealed bias as measured by comparisons of clinicians’ 
ratings across sexual orientation conditions, the authors noted they could not determine 
judgment accuracy because there was no clear-cut standard by which to judge the 
clinicians’ ratings.  As explained in the study, “One interpretation of the results is that the 
effect of client bisexuality on clinical judgment may partly reflect therapists’ accurate 
beliefs about differences among bisexual, gay, and heterosexual men” (p. 173).  
Therefore, in studies pertaining to bias in clinical judgment, it is oftentimes impossible to 
determine a standard for accuracy. 
Moderator variables were chosen on the basis of prior research findings related to 
clinical judgment and experience.  Other moderator variables were chosen because they 
are commonly addressed in meta-analyses (e.g., study quality).  The present study 
examined the moderating effects of the following variables, the majority based on the 
Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis and some added for the present meta-analysis: (a) 
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experience type, (b) experience breadth, (c) judgment type, (d) criterion validity for 
accuracy dependent measure, (e) provision of feedback, (f) publication source, (g) 
ecological validity of the method of study, (h), ecological validity of stimulus, (i) relation 
of experience to the research design, (j) experience as a major variable, (k) study quality, 
(l) profession type, (m) inclusion of non-mental health participants, and (n) publication 
year.  Whereas most moderator variables were drawn from the Spengler et al. meta-
analysis to allow for comparison, profession type and inclusion of non-mental health 
participants were added for the present meta-analysis.  It is hypothesized that moderator 
variables will reveal few significant findings, as was found in the Spengler et al. meta-
analysis.  A more detailed discussion of the present study’s hypotheses will be outlined in 
Chapter 2.  
Implications for findings 
 The findings of the present meta-analysis will have important implications for the 
field of psychology.  It has been long assumed that clinical judgment improves with 
experience.  Clients and clinicians as well as the general public assume that more 
experienced clinicians yield more accurate judgments.  If this assumption were shown to 
be untrue, the perceived benefits of receiving mental health services from more 
experienced clinicians would be called into question.  If clients perceive that even a small 
increase in judgment accuracy will have important personal or professional implications, 
however, they may nonetheless choose relatively more experienced clinicians (Spengler 
et al., 2009).  Training programs would be forced to make integral changes in order to 
improve their curricula.  Even worse, clients and the general public may experience less 
faith in the counseling process overall.  Also, psychotherapy is likely to be ineffective if 
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clinicians’ decisions are inaccurate (Wolfgang et al., 2006).  Additionally, client drop-out 
becomes more of a problem with inaccurate judgments (Epperson, Bushway, & Warman, 
1983).  The Spengler et al. meta-analysis revealed judgment accuracy slightly improved 
with increased clinical experience.  However, an update and expansion is needed to 
cross-validate and test the robustness of the Spengler et al. findings with more recent 
research as well as test additional moderator variables.  For these reasons, the present 
meta-analysis seeks to investigate the relationship between clinical judgment and 
experience of studies published from 1997 to 2010.  
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature 
regarding the relationship between clinical judgment and experience.  Additionally, this 
chapter will provide a rationale for updating the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis.  
The purpose of the present study is to conduct a meta-analysis of studies between the 
years 1997 and 2010 that address whether or not clinical judgment accuracy improves 
with experience.  The Spengler et al. meta-analysis synthesized studies published 
between 1970 and 1996 and found a small, but reliable effect of d = .12.  There was little 
variability in the obtained results, suggesting that experience marginally improves 
judgment accuracy regardless of most other variables.  The present study is needed to 
capture the potential impact of using current research as well as assess new moderator 
variables in addition to those drawn from the Spengler et al. meta-analysis. 
Relationship between experience and expertise 
 Contrary to what is sometimes assumed experience and expertise seem to be 
related, but separate concepts (Eells et al., 2005; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Sedlmeier, 2005).  
Hayes (1985), for example, distinguished experience from expertise and quantified the 
amount of experience needed to gain expertise.  He found that experts in various fields 
acquired an expert level of performance after approximately 10 years of practice.  
Similarly, Eells et al., in a study of the differences in the quality of psychotherapy case 
formulations, distinguished experienced clinicians from expert clinicians.  In their study, 
65 clinicians were divided into three separate groups.  The first group consisted of 24 
novice clinicians with fewer than 1,500 hours of supervised psychotherapy experience.  
The second group consisted of 19 experienced clinicians with at least 10 years of 
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experience.  The third group, in contrast, consisted of 22 expert clinicians.  The expert 
group was identified as “meeting one or more of three criteria: (a) developed a method of 
psychotherapy case formulation; (b) led one or more workshops for professionals on how 
to construct case formulations; or (c) published one or more scientific articles, books, or 
book chapters on the topic of psychotherapy case formulation” (Eells et al., p. 581).  
After listening to six standardized vignettes via audiotape, the clinicians were asked to 
provide verbal case formulations.  Case formulations were evaluated on multiple 
dimensions, such as comprehensiveness, complexity, and formulation elaboration. 
 Eells et al. (2005) found that expert clinicians performed better than novice and 
experienced clinicians when considering many dimensions of case formulation quality, 
for example demonstrating superior comprehensiveness, elaboration, and complexity of 
case formulations as compared to those of novices or experienced clinicians.  In addition, 
expert clinicians were found to provide more elaborate treatment plans that were better 
fitted to the clients’ needs as compared to the other groups of clinicians.  Moreover, the 
expert clinicians’ formulations across the six vignettes displayed more consistency and 
structure compared to those of the other groups.  This finding may allude to the 
hypothesis that experts’ judgments have become somewhat systematic or automatized.  
Eells et al. attributed the superiority of expert case formulations to the hypothesized 
tendency of expert clinicians to produce responses based on a priori cognitive schema, 
whereas novice and experienced clinicians were believed to have less structured or well-
defined schema.  Although Eells et al. found that expert clinicians provided the highest 
quality case formulations, they found that novice clinicians outperformed experienced 
clinicians when comparing these two groups with each other. Eells et al. hypothesized 
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that both expert and novice clinicians diligently and consistently worked to ensure they 
kept to a high standard of case formulation, whereas experienced clinicians often worked 
in the field for years without calibrating their work with professional standards.  They 
concluded that acquiring a certain number of years of experience did not always 
guarantee an expert level of performance, as evidenced by novices outperforming 
experienced clinicians.  Instead, Eells et al. explained that novice clinicians often have 
opportunities to work closely with expert clinicians through their studies and practica.  
Experts, as mentioned previously, were believed by Eells et al. to calibrate their 
performance via cognitive tools, such as highly structured and well developed schema.  
Eells et al. believed both novices and experts tended to engage more frequently in self-
monitoring, whereas experienced clinicians were believed to work in a more isolated 
setting less conducive to self-monitoring and calibration with expert performance. 
  For the present study, it is important to understand the distinction between 
experience and expertise.  If expertise is not automatically gained with a certain number 
of years of experience, one can easily see how some clinicians never reach an expert level 
of performance.  Frensch and Sternberg (1989) defined expertise as “the ability, acquired 
by practice and experience, to perform qualitatively well in a particular task domain” (p. 
189).  The definition provided above, however, assumes practice and experience is the 
cause of gaining expertise.  Perhaps this was because it has commonly been assumed that 
expertise should be gained through increased practice and experience rather than from 
some innate talent or proclivity.  Additionally, the definition addressed the construct of 
quality, rather than judgment accuracy, decision-making speed or some other measure, as 
being the central indicator of expertise status.  Moreover, the definition assumed that 
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expertise would be gained in a particular domain, rather than assuming one could gain 
global expertise status across a wide variety of tasks.  In other words, clinicians may be 
experts in some aspects of clinical practice, such as providing quality case formulations, 
but not perform at expert levels in other aspects.  Eells et al. recognized this distinction 
when they stated, “Thus, one would not necessarily expect the experts in the present 
study to excel in other aspects of the practice of their profession, including perhaps 
applying the formulation in therapeutic interventions” (p. 587).  According to Frensch 
and Sternberg, expertise seemed to be domain-dependent. 
 While many reviewers in the mental health field agree with the Frensch and 
Sternberg (1989) definition of expertise (Lichtenberg, 1997; Sedlmeier, 2005), others 
have described expertise as if it were some mystical, innate, and domain-independent 
construct that a clinician either has or does not have (Zeldow, 2009).  In this sense, 
novice clinicians can be sure to feel some degree of hopelessness as they struggle to 
discover whether or not they were blessed with this talent.  Additionally, they may never 
know whether or not they have gained expertise status even through years of practice and 
experience (Lichtenberg).  According to Witteman and van den Bercken (2007), when 
experts are questioned about a decision they have made, they will often deny knowing 
how they arrived at a particular decision.  This unawareness or underutilization of meta-
cognitive and self-reflective processes may prove to be dangerous for clinicians and 
clients alike.  Not only can faulty cognitive processes occur beyond the awareness of the 
clinician, but this lack of awareness has the potential to present problems in the training 
of future clinicians.  One can imagine how “expert” clinicians, with limited awareness of 
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how they arrived at particular decisions, would find it difficult to explicitly teach these 
skills to trainees in a formal, unambiguous manner. 
 The second perspective on expertise, that of expertise as an elusive, innate 
quality, is by far a grimmer one for inexperienced and experienced clinicians alike.  In 
other words, both inexperienced and experienced clinicians would find it difficult to 
achieve expert status and know when they have reached it due to the emphasis on an 
abstract, ill-constructed definition of expertise.  They then may be forced to rely on 
alternative methods of identification, such as peer nomination (Elman et al., 2005; 
Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Sonnentag, 1998).  Peer nomination allows for expert 
identification by relying on the evaluations of the so-called expert’s peers.  According to 
Kahneman and Klein, peer nomination techniques have the potential to distinguish 
between expert, experienced, and novice performers.  For example, Sonnentag conducted 
a study in which software designers were observed by their peers in a software design 
task.  The peers were required to rate the performance of the software designers and 
identify “high performers” (p. 703).  The selection of these high performers was further 
evaluated with regards to the software designers’ objective performance on the software 
design task.  In this case, peer nomination was shown to be a valid method of expert 
identification.  According to Elman et al., peer nomination offers one method of expert 
identification; however, peer nomination, in addition to the attainment of licensure and 
certification, the receipt of professional awards, and the publication of journal articles, 
does not encompass the full spectrum of what an expert clinician represents. Peer 
nomination techniques may prove to be less helpful in the identification of expert mental 
health clinicians due to the variety of ways in which expert clinicians approach tasks 
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consistent with their theoretical orientations.  For example, it may be more difficult for a 
mental health clinician who subscribes to behaviorist theories and techniques to judge the 
expertness of another mental health clinician who employs psychodynamic approaches. 
 Although there is some degree of variability in how experts are identified and/or 
defined, research has attempted to extrapolate the differences in how experts perform 
compared to novice clinicians.  Experts have been found to perform qualitatively 
different from novices (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1986; Chan, 2006; Chi et al., 1982; 
Ericsson, 2005; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Haerem & Rau, 2007; Hinsley et al., 1978; Leon & 
Perez, 2001; Lesgold et al., 1988; Nickerson et al., 1985; O’Reilly et al., 1980; Polanyi, 
1962).  Experts, for example, have demonstrated the ability to make broader inferences 
due to their knowledge being organized into broad and complex memory structures 
(Ericsson).  Additionally, they have been shown to be able to make connections between 
seemingly irreconcilable concepts (Hinsley et al.).  Expert judgments have been shown to 
be more sophisticated and rely on more advanced critical reasoning skills (Chi et al.; 
Polanyi).  Some other differences include having the ability to perceive large, meaningful 
patterns, displaying superior long- and short-term memory, and displaying more 
advanced self-monitoring skills (Chan; Chi et al.; Ericsson; Glaser & Chi; Haerem & 
Rau; Hinsley et al.; Leon & Perez; Lesgold et al.; Nickerson et al.; O’Reilly et al.; 
Polanyi; Sedlmeier, 2005).  Perhaps one of the most easily recognizable differences in 
expert performance is the greater automatic processing of information (Glaser & Chi). 
One of the most important differences in how experts in any field approach tasks 
may be the difference in their initial perceptions of a task (Chan, 2006; Day & Lord, 
1992; Ericsson & Charness, 1994; O’Reilly et al., 1980).  Not only do experts differ in 
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the depth and breadth of their knowledge bases, but they also differ in how they 
comprehend aspects of a given problem or situation.  This difference in perception may 
be one of the causes for why it is difficult to improve the performances of novices by a 
simple transfer of knowledge.  Experts may perceive problems as less complex than non-
experts due to being more familiar with the basic principles underlying those tasks.  As a 
result, experts view problems as more manageable than do non-experts.  Specifically, 
experts tend to view problems according to their fundamental principles or deep 
underlying structures.  Novices, on the other hand, tend to view problems according to 
their superficial characteristics or surface structures (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; 
Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Haerem & Rau, 2007).  Surface structures, in this case, refer 
to objects, keywords, or physical configurations involving the interaction of several 
objects.  Deep structures, on the other hand, refer to the underlying principles presented 
in a given problem.  A study by Chi et al. demonstrated this difference.  Subjects in this 
study were asked to assess problems in physics.  The surface structures mentioned in the 
physics problems included physical descriptors of the objects, such as “spring” or 
“inclined plane” and/or keywords contained in the problem, such as “rotation” or 
“velocity problems.”  The deep structures involved in the physics problems were related 
to underlying principles of physics, such as Newton’s laws.  Experts were shown to 
utilize abstracts principles of physics when analyzing a problem, whereas novices 
focused on the problem’s surface structures, including physical descriptors of the objects 
and keywords contained in the problems.  As Haerem and Rau noted, expert-novice 
differences in task perception also involve task complexity.  For example, experts were 
found to view tasks as less variable and more analyzable than non-experts due to experts’ 
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tendencies to focus on the underlying principles of the task.  Haerem and Rau’s findings 
supported differences in how experts and non-experts perceive tasks; therefore, they 
emphasized the importance of future research in expert-novice differences to examine not 
only how these different groups perform but also how their initial perceptions of the tasks 
differed.  Haerem and Rau concluded that although their findings supported differences 
in how experts and non-experts perceive tasks, these differences in perceptions do not 
always result in the differences in performance we would expect.  Several other factors 
may be involved in measuring expert-novice performance differences, for example, task 
complexity and motivation. 
 In bringing the discussion of expertise and characteristics of experts more 
specifically to the field of psychology, the frameworks of Hollon and Kriss (1984) as 
well as Wierzbicki (1993) are useful.  Expertise in counseling, as it relates to clinical 
judgment, can be analyzed in terms of three interrelated constructs: cognitive structures, 
processes, and products.  Cognitive structures have been defined as organizational bodies 
that contain clinicians’ knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions about themselves, their 
clients, and their world (Hollon & Kriss).  Cognitive structures are believed to be 
accessed when the clinician attempts to label and explain incoming information as well as 
search for additional information (Wierzbicki).  Cognitive processes, on the other hand, 
pertain to the methods used when clinicians combine incoming information with existing 
knowledge structures in order to form judgments.  Finally, cognitive products have been 
defined as the results of information processing (Hollon & Kriss).  Errors may occur 
within any of the three aspects of decision-making.  Often, errors in one lead to errors in 
another due to the interrelated nature of these cognitive domains.  For example, clinicians 
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who utilize faulty cognitive structures will most likely produce inaccurate judgments.  
Although one would expect and hope that functioning in all three of these cognitive 
domains would improve with increased clinical practice and training, a growing body of 
research suggests otherwise. 
Influence of bias on clinical judgment 
 When discussing novice-expert differences and attempting to understand how 
novices can achieve expert performance levels, a review of judgment bias is essential.  
According to Gambrill (2005), “Bias is a systematic ‘leaning to one side’ that distorts the 
accuracy of results” (p. 328).  Although distinct from judgment error, bias has long been 
considered an important obstacle preventing many clinicians from arriving at accurate 
judgments (Garb, 1998).  In terms of Hollon and Kris’s framework, judgment biases 
based on client and clinician variables relate to functioning in the cognitive structures 
domain, where clinicians hold their attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge, and assumptions 
about themselves and others (Wierzbicki, 1993).  Bias comes in many forms, ranging 
from bias related to client characteristics (e.g., socioeconomic status, age, sex-role, race, 
and gender; Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977; Garb, 1998) to bias related to various 
characteristics of the clinician (Garb, 1998; Raines & Rohrer, 1955).  Garb’s influential 
book, Studying the Clinician: Judgment Research and Psychological Assessment, was 
published in 1998.  In it Garb provided a comprehensive review of studies pertaining to 
clinical judgmental biases in the mental health field. 
 An overview of biases based on race, social class, gender, age, and sex role 
revealed mixed empirical results.  For example, Garb (1998) cited studies in which 
African-American psychiatric inpatients were predicted to be more violent than their 
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Caucasian counterparts (Lewis et al., 1990; McNiel & Binder, 1995).  On the other hand, 
this type of race bias did not seem to be present in the clinical prediction of violence 
taking place in the community (Lewis et al.; Lidz et al., 1993).  Similarly, Garb (1998) 
found mixed results for studies addressing gender bias.  Some studies were cited in which 
gender bias was demonstrated in clinicians’ ratings of prognosis (Agell & Rothblum, 
1991; Fernbach et al., 1989; Hansen & Reekie, 1990; Teri, 1982).  In most studies of 
prognosis, however, gender bias was not shown to be present (Adams & Betz, 1993; 
Bernstein & LeComte, 1982; Billingsley, 1977; Dailey, 1980; Elovitz & Salvia, 1982; 
Fischer, Dulaney, Fazio, Hudak, & Zivotofsky, 1976; Foon, 1989; Hardy & Johnson, 
1992; Lewis et al.; Lopez, Smith, Wolkenstein, & Charlin, 1993; Rabinowitz & Lukoff, 
1995; Schwartz & Abramowitz, 1975; Settin, 1982; Stearns, Penner, & Kimmel, 1980; 
Wrobel, 1993; Zygmond & Denton, 1988). 
 For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that assessing clinician bias 
is a multifaceted issue.  In Garb’s (1998) comprehensive review, biases of many types 
were found to be present in many studies, but only under certain conditions.  Although it 
is sometimes difficult to capture particular client variable biases at work in the mental 
health setting, scholars believe these biases do pertain to clinicians of varying experience 
levels and that they have the potential to negatively impact judgment accuracy.  In a 
discussion of the rates of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) diagnosis among 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients, for example, Eubanks-Carter and Goldfried (2006) 
stated, “The association of male homosexuality and BPD may also be related to the 
strong association between BPD and female gender” (p. 753).  Eubanks-Carter and 
Goldfried were interested in examining the relationship between clients’ gender and 
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sexual orientation and clinician-provided diagnoses of BPD.  They explained that 
although homosexuality was no longer an official diagnosis in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychological Association, 2000) and should not be viewed as pathological, 
clinicians still displayed tendencies to overpathologize gay and bisexual men.  The risk of 
clinicians misdiagnosing gay and bisexual men with BPD is especially high when 
considering certain borderline-like traits that are common among gay and bisexual men 
experiencing a crisis in sexual identity, including identity disturbance, affective 
instability, and self-mutilation (Gonsiorek, 1982). 
The discussion regarding BPD diagnoses and sexual orientation highlights the 
complexity of the relationship between bias and judgment error.  Clinicians with negative 
biases towards gay and bisexual clients are at risk of overpathologizing the clients’ 
reported problems, which oftentimes leads to clinicians assigning diagnoses that are 
inappropriate or that are overly severe.  In clinical judgment research, judgment error is 
oftentimes relatively easy to measure and detect due to its necessary reliance on some 
agreed upon standard by which to rate individual judgments.  Judgment bias, however, 
often goes unnoticed and is more difficult to detect due to researchers’ difficulties 
establishing a baseline for comparison. 
 In addition to biases based on client variables, clinicians display bias based on 
faulty cognitive processes.  These types of biases interfere with the way clinicians 
integrate novel information with preexisting knowledge (Wierzbicki, 1993).  Some of 
these biases include confirmatory bias, hindsight bias, anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics, representativeness heuristics, availability heuristics, and the newly defined 
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affective heuristic (Garb, 2005; Garb, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Confirmatory 
bias exists when clinicians display a tendency to seek out information that confirms or 
supports their prior beliefs and assumptions about their clients.  Disconfirmatory 
evidence is de-emphasized or, in the worst cases, ignored (Davies, 2003).  Many studies 
have revealed confirmatory bias at work for clinicians and laypeople (Davies; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1978; Elstein, Shulman, & Sprafka, 1978; Mahoney, 1976; O’Brien, 2009; 
Snyder, 1981; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Strohmer, 
Moilanen, & Barry, 1988; Strohmer, Shivy, & Chiodo, 1990). 
 Hindsight bias has been defined as the tendency to believe, once the outcome is 
revealed, that the outcome could have been predicted more easily than actually could in 
reality.  Hindsight bias occurs when individuals try to make sense of certain outcomes by 
elaborating causal relations between antecedent conditions and the outcome (Blank & 
Nestler, 2007).  Hindsight bias has been demonstrated in a variety of domains, such as 
historical events (Fischhoff, 1975), medical diagnoses (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 
1988), sporting events (Pezzo, 2003; Roese & Maniar, 1997), and political elections 
(Blank, Fischer, & Erdfelder, 2003).  Additionally, hindsight bias has been demonstrated 
in the area of clinical judgment (Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; 
Fischhoff), and has been associated with inaccurate judgments. 
 Judgmental heuristics are cognitive shortcuts commonly used in decision-making 
by people in general and including mental health clinicians (Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  The anchoring heuristic is described as a 
phenomenon in which individuals are presented with information in a sequential manner 
and emphasize information received first.  These individuals tend to make initial 
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judgments based on the first information presented and then make insufficient 
adjustments away from that initial judgment as additional information is presented.  Even 
though information presented later in the sequence may be disconfirming, or have greater 
importance to the judgment task at hand, it is ignored or given inadequate attention 
(Carlson, 1990).  Research has shown the anchoring heuristic to cause an effect on 
clinical decision-making (Clavelle & Turner, 1980; Dailey, 1952; Friedlander & Phillips, 
1984; Friedlander & Stockman, 1983; Gauron & Dickinson, 1966; Meehl, 1960; 
Oskamp, 1965; Richards & Wierzbicki, 1990; Sandifer et al., 1970).  For example, 
Friedlander and Phillips asked clinicians to rate two clients after reading summaries of 
five therapy sessions for each client.  Client summaries included information about the 
presence of suicidal ideation or anorexia at either the first or fourth therapy session.  
Those clinicians who were presented with this information first often rated the clients as 
more maladaptive than those who received the information at the fourth therapy session.  
The variability in the timing of information during sessions and/or intake is one way in 
which clinicians commonly risk engaging in bias, which subsequently may lead to 
judgment error. 
 The representativeness heuristic can be described as the tendency for individuals 
to judge the likelihood that a person has some characteristic based on the degree to which 
the person is similar to the class of persons with that characteristic without taking base 
rates into consideration (Kahneman et al., 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Wierzbicki, 
1993).  When base rates are ignored, clinicians risk failing to recognize that some clinical 
predictions are unlikely because of the infrequency of the diagnosis or event (Garb, 
1996).  Garb (1998) noted three types of biases based on the representativeness heuristic.  
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The first involves the clinician comparing his or her client to others who clearly possess 
the trait in question.  The clients who clearly possess the trait are referred to as 
exemplars.  The second type involves the clinician exhibiting bias based on his or her 
concept of the “typical” person possessing the trait in question.  In this case the bias is 
based on stereotype.  The third type refers to the clinician exhibiting bias based on 
comparison to a theoretical standard that represents the specific trait.  This type involves 
clinician bias based on prototype.  Garb (1998) stated prototypes were more often the 
focus of theory and research than were exemplars and stereotypes.  In the area of clinical 
judgment, clinicians relying on the representativeness heuristic are at risk for error in 
various ways.  For example, a clinician evaluating a client for Bipolar Disorder may 
compare that client to one in the past who is believed by the clinician to be the exemplar 
of Bipolar Disorder.  The clinician’s accuracy in his or her evaluation of the present client 
depends largely upon whether or not the client in the past represented an accurate 
depiction of an individual with Bipolar Disorder.  The representativeness heuristic can 
also cause judgment error in behavioral prediction.  Poole, Lindsay, Memon, & Bull 
(1995) asked clinicians to list client indicators that suggest previous childhood sexual 
abuse.  Clinicians most frequently reported “adult sexual dysfunction” (p. 430) as an 
indicator.  However, the research field is lacking in empirical support for a connection 
between childhood sexual abuse and adult sexual dysfunction.  Poole et al. noted that the 
relation between childhood sexual abuse and adult sexual dysfunction is at risk of being 
overestimated by clinicians, which may lead them to produce inaccurate 
conceptualizations of their clients’ histories.  In addition, one can imagine that if a 
clinician evaluating a client with diagnosed sexual dysfunction suspects childhood sexual 
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abuse, medical causes for the dysfunction may be overlooked and/or underemphasized.  
Some studies have demonstrated these types of errors in progress in the mental health 
field (Dawes, 1994; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Meehl, 1973; Meehl & Rosen, 1955; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 Other types of errors and bias beyond the scope of the present review include 
errors based on invalid or unreliable data and/or instruments and errors based on failing 
to recognize regression toward the mean (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  There are a 
multitude of areas and ways in which error can occur to influence clinicians’ judgment, 
including biases based on client characteristics, clinician characteristics, faulty cognitive 
processes, invalid or unreliable data and/or instruments, and a lack of understanding of 
regression toward the mean.  When the experience level of the clinician is assessed in 
terms of its effect on judgment accuracy, one can easily understand how clinicians 
unknowingly develop tendencies to make these errors over time, and how it is possible 
that the more experience clinicians have, the more time they have had to practice and 
make these types of errors automatic. 
Effects of experience on clinical judgment 
 It is because of these pervasive biases and errors outlined above that some 
scholars have concluded experienced clinicians should not outperform novices (Dawes, 
1994; Faust, 1984, 2006; Garb, 1998, 2005; Lichtenberg, 1997; Ruscio, 2006; Sternberg, 
Roediger, & Halpern, 2007; Wiggins, 1973).  Some research suggests that novice 
clinicians perform as well as, or even better than, more experienced clinicians (e.g., 
Blashfield, Sprock, Pinkston, & Hodgin, 1985; Boland, 2002; Garb & Boyle, 2003; 
Gaudette, 1992; Hickling et al., 2002; Kim & Ahn, 2002; Leon & Perez, 2001; 
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Rodriguez, 2002; Ruscio & Stern, 2005; Zozula, 2001).  According to Garb (1998), 
“Overall, results on presumed expertise, experience, training, and validity are 
disappointing” (p. 17).  Garb (1998) concluded in his review that experts are no more 
accurate than less experienced clinicians and clinicians were not found to be more 
accurate than graduate students.  In his estimation, the only uplifting results were that 
clinicians may be more accurate than beginning graduate students and advanced graduate 
students were found to be more accurate than beginning graduate students.  Furthermore, 
clinicians were found to be more accurate than lay judges.  In a recent study, Witteman 
and van den Bercken stated that the gains in judgment accuracy associated with more 
experience that have been found in medical research have not been realized in the mental 
health field. 
By contrast, other research has demonstrated a positive correlation between 
judgment accuracy and experience (e.g., Arkell, 1976; Berven, 1985; Brammer, 2002; 
Garcia, 1993; Rerick, 1999; Wilkin, 2001).  Brammer, for example, asked psychology 
graduate students and psychologists to provide diagnoses after participating in a 
computerized case simulation in which a clinical interview was reproduced.  Based upon 
questions asked by the clinicians, the simulated client provided appropriate, pregenerated 
responses.  According to Brammer, the ability of the clinicians to arrive at a correct 
diagnosis was associated with the clinicians’ level of training and years of experience.  In 
other words, clinicians with higher levels of training and greater years of experience were 
relatively more accurate in their diagnostic decisions. 
 Other research has attempted to further describe and explain differences in 
clinical judgment with novices compared to more experienced clinicians (Brammer, 
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2002; Cummings et al., 1990; Eells et al., 2005; Kim & Ahn, 2002; Kivlighan & Quigley, 
1991; Martin et al., 1989; Mayfield et al., 1999; Mumma & Mooney, 2007; Nisbett et al., 
1983; O’Byrne & Goodyear, 1997; Tracey et al., 1988).  As stated in Chapter 1, however, 
these differences do not always result in experienced clinicians outperforming novices on 
measures of judgment accuracy.  Martin et al., for example, found that novice and 
experienced clinicians differed on the extensiveness of their therapeutic 
conceptualizations.  As an added inquiry, Martin et al. addressed whether or not 
differences existed in the conceptualizations used by novice versus experienced 
counselors regarding a) the counseling process in general, and b) the specific problems of 
individual clients.  They found that the more experienced the clinician, the more he or she 
conceptualized the client problems in relation to deep, underlying structures regarding the 
counseling process in general.  Less experienced clinicians, in contrast, tended to focus 
on surface elements, such as the specific problems of the individual clients.  This is 
consistent with previous findings of the differences in how novices and more experienced 
clinicians conceptualize client problems (Chi et al., 1981; Ericsson & Charness, 1994; 
Haerem & Rau, 2007).  Martin et al. noted, “Experienced clinicians conceptualized the 
specific problems of their individual clients in relation to their conceptual structures for 
counseling in general” (p. 399).  When addressing specific client problems, more 
experienced clinicians tended to rely on their previously established schemata regarding 
the general counseling process, with minor adjustments.  The novice counselors, in 
contrast, were shown to require considerably more client-specific concepts in order to 
form their conceptualizations of the individual clients and their problems.  While the 
schemata employed by experienced clinicians was likely more time- and energy-efficient 
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and led to a greater feeling of confidence by the seasoned counselors, one could also 
envision how having more automatic and inflexible schemata could lead to a “blinder”  
(Martin et al.) effect.  Martin et al. concluded that while greater automization of decision-
making is generally perceived as a beneficial acquisition in such fields as mathematics, 
physics, computer programming, and medicine, the subjective nature of clinical decision-
making in the field of psychology means greater automization has the potential to hinder 
accuracy. 
 Traditional narrative reviewers investigating the relationship between clinical 
experience and judgment accuracy have typically claimed that gaining clinical experience 
does not necessarily lead to better judgment accuracy (Faust, 1986; Faust & Ziskin, 1988; 
Garb, 1998; Highlen & Hill, 1984; Lichtenberg, 1997; Watts, 1980; Wiggins, 1973; 
Ziskin, 1981).  A related report of great importance was conducted by the American 
Psychological Association in 1982, which clearly stated no evidence had been found of a 
positive relationship between professional competence and years of professional 
experience.  It was further suggested that it was “important, perhaps, imperative, that 
psychology begin to assemble a body of persuasive evidence bearing on the value of 
specific educational and training experience” (p. 2).  Although traditional narrative 
reviews are not without their limitations, they have served to add to the experience-
judgment accuracy debate by highlighting the lack of a definitive and clear-cut positive 
relationship between clinician experience and judgment accuracy.  In order to better 
understand the complexities of the debate, it is important to address the possible reasons 
why judgment accuracy may not automatically improve with more clinical experience. 
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Explanations for clinical judgment research findings 
 There are many reasons why clinical judgment has not been shown to improve 
with experience in much research.  First, clinical judgment involves complex, cognitive 
processes that are difficult to replicate and teach.  Second, clinicians are often forced to 
make decisions in the absence of immediate feedback, increasing risk for error.  Third, 
clinical skill learning can be categorized as experiential learning, in which the clinician 
learns by doing.  The two conditions for experiential learning, which involve a clear 
understanding of what constitutes an incorrect response and immediate, unambiguous, 
and consistent feedback, are rarely met in the practice of psychology (Dawes, 1994).   
 In addition to the lack of clear-cut guidelines as to what constitutes a correct 
clinical response and the absence of useful feedback, Dawes (1994) highlighted other 
reasons clinical judgment does not necessarily improve with experience.  One of these 
reasons pertains less to clinician characteristics and more to the nature of the clinical 
problem itself.  He stated that clinical judgment problems were often “ill-structured” 
(Dawes, p. 232).  Ill-structured problems lack clear parameters or constraints.  For 
example, clinicians are often faced with decision-making regarding appropriate 
interventions for specific clients.  Given the plethora of various interventions and the 
ever-changing views on what constitutes appropriate and/or ethical interventions, 
clinicians are forced to make treatment decisions based on ill-defined constraints.  
Furthermore, intervention choice is often a function of non-clinical constraints, such as 
limits of reimbursement by insurance carriers.  Yet another issue of debate is related to 
establishing proper end-points and solutions for clients.  For example, success in 
counseling can be measured by various constructs and taken from the perspective of 
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various individuals.  If a client were to attend career counseling, one clinician might view 
the client applying for various jobs as a successful outcome, while another might only 
consider the client obtaining stable employment as a success.  There are so many ways to 
measure effective solutions that it is often difficult to judge whether or not clinicians have 
demonstrated the ability to treat clients effectively (Eells, et al., 2005).   
 Although the nature of clinical problems as ill-structured adds even more 
difficulty to the clinical judgment debate, most clinicians maintain that experts should be 
better able than novices to transform these problems into solvable problems, even if that 
means imposing artificial parameters for the sake of manageability.  Due to the subjective 
and socially constructed nature of clinical problems, however, one can easily reach the 
conclusion that expertness is also a socially constructed concept (Kahneman & Klein, 
2009).  Especially in the field of psychology, where most, if not all clinical problems can 
be described as ill-defined, ”expert” may be defined by the clinician who is able to reach 
a consensus with his or her client, colleagues, and community as to whether or not an 
outcome was successful.  According to Zeldow (2009), “Clinical practice is not a science 
that aspires to truth and the development of replicable and standardized interventions.  
Rather, it is an interpretive or narrative activity whose objective is the reduction of 
suffering in particular individuals” (p. 3).  Additionally, it has been said that clinical 
judgment often relies on practical reasoning, or the act of making the most appropriate 
and well-informed treatment decisions under uncertain circumstances (Montgomery, 
2006).  For the most part, there are no clear-cut guidelines upon which clinicians can 
judge their outcomes as there are in other fields.  Much of clinicians’ responsibility is to 
create persuasive arguments in support of their treatment decisions.  In fact, effective 
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case-making and argumentation may even be viewed as more important than accurate 
clinical judgment when it comes to gauging the quality of clinicians’ judgments. 
Given the long-standing debate and variable findings regarding whether or not 
judgment accuracy improves with more experience, a comprehensive assessment of the 
research is needed.  In the next sections, rationales are provided for the use of meta-
analysis in assessing the experience-accuracy relation as well as for the importance of 
updating and expanding Spengler et al.’s (2009) comprehensive meta-analysis. 
Limitations of traditional narrative reviews 
 According to Cook and Leviton (1980), traditional narrative reviews have been 
criticized based on three important points: a) a simple box count is used to tally the 
number of studies of statistical significance regardless of effect size; b) the group of 
studies for which the review is conducted is often biased; and c) a simple box count 
ignores important statistical interactions.  The first point addresses the idea that 
traditional narrative reviews ignore information about the direction and magnitude of 
relationships (Light & Smith, 1971).  The result is that findings are overly conservative 
due to results of statistical non-significance being counted as failures regardless of their 
direction.  This is especially problematic in the social sciences, where studies often rely 
on small sample sizes, which in turn, lead to low statistical power and non-significance 
(Cook & Leviton).  Meta-analysis, with its inherent synthesis of effect sizes, and other 
estimates of magnitudes less dependent on sample size, avoids some of these pitfalls of 
the traditional narrative review (Light & Smith; Smith & Glass, 1977). 
 The second major problem of traditional narrative reviews, that of bias in the 
sample of studies used, can manifest in too narrow of a literature search, studies being 
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excluded based on methodological issues, and studies excluded based on unrelated 
theoretical constructs (Cook & Leviton, 1980).  Meta-analysts also risk applying too rigid 
of exclusionary criteria and excluding relevant and informative studies (Smith & Glass).  
According to Glass (1978), when conducting a meta-analysis a wide net should be cast to 
include any relevant studies regardless of variability in how the variables of importance 
were defined.  Instead of excluding studies based upon perceived variability, post-hoc 
comparisons should be performed afterwards to identify subsets of the data.  In this way, 
meta-analysis has the potential to diminish subjective exclusion of articles based upon the 
meta-analysts’ preliminary reviews of the included studies.  The third problem with 
traditional narrative reviews pertains to the idea of the box count ignoring important 
interactions.  According to Cook and Leviton, many traditional narrative reviews intend 
to test simple main effects only and ignore other interactions deemed irrelevant by the 
reviewers.  Due to this exclusion, traditional narrative reviews risk oversimplifying 
phenomena and failing to recognize complex, important interactions.  As Cook and 
Leviton state, “The best narrative reviews identify and explain contradictory and 
unexpected data patterns for which no specific boxes were initially set up” (p. 463). 
Rationale for the use of meta-analysis 
 Due to the limitations of traditional narrative reviews, and the importance of 
understanding the relation between experience and judgment accuracy, a review of this 
research will be conducted using meta-analysis techniques.  The statistical foundations of 
meta-analysis were laid out by William Gemmell Cochran, who in 1937 discussed a 
method of combining effect sizes across independent studies.  He was also a forerunner 
in laying out much of the statistical techniques that modern meta-analysis is built upon, 
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such as inverse variance weighting and homogeneity testing.  Although Cochran’s 
methods laid the statistical foundation for meta-analysis, little attention was paid to meta-
analysis until the 1950s and not until the 1970s in the social sciences (Hunt, 1997).  In 
1976, meta-analysis received its name by Gene Glass in his presentation at a San 
Francisco conference.  Glass’ paper presented five basic phases of the meta-analytic 
process.  In Glass’ (1976) words, 
Meta-analysis refers to the analysis of the analyses.  I use it to refer to the 
statistical analysis of a large collection of results from individual studies for the 
purpose of integrating the findings.  It connotes a rigorous alternative to the 
casual, narrative discussions of research studies which typify our attempts to 
make sense of the rapidly expanding research literature (p. 3). 
 Perhaps one of the most influential periods in the history of meta-analysis, and 
definitely one of the most controversial, included Smith and Glass’ (1977) meta-analysis 
of psychotherapy outcomes, entitled “The benefits of psychotherapy.”  Smith and Glass’ 
study arose in response to Hans Eysenck’s (1952) review in which nineteen studies, 
covering over seven thousand cases related to both psychoanalytic and eclectic types of 
treatment, were analyzed.  The findings of Eysenck’s review failed to support the 
hypothesis that psychotherapy facilitated recovery from neurotic disorder.  Many 
scholars, including Smith and Glass, were quick to critique Eysenck's review and defend 
psychotherapists’ livelihoods. In response, Smith and Glass conducted the first ever 
social science meta-analyses in an effort to assess the effectiveness of psychotherapy.  
They combined studies involving a variety of therapeutic orientations as applied to a 
variety of populations.  According to their findings, psychotherapy works and all types 
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work approximately equally well (Hunt).  Several additional meta-analyses of 
psychotherapy effects have been conducted since Smith and Glass, and meta-analysis has 
been recently utilized for a wide variety of research topics, for example hindsight bias 
(Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004), cognitive-behavior therapy for anxiety 
disorders (Belleville, Cousineau, Levrier, & St. Pierre-Delorme, & Machand, 2010), and 
internalizing problems in children (Reijntjes, Kamphuis, Prinzie, & Telch, 2010). 
Rationale for present study 
 To date, only one meta-analysis has been conducted evaluating the relationship of 
experience and judgment accuracy (Spengler et al., 2009).  According to Spengler et al., 
“No other area of clinical judgment research has been synthesized by meta-analytic 
techniques” (p. 7) aside from two meta-analyses evaluating clinical versus statistical 
prediction (Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Grove, Zald, Lebox, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000).  In the 
Spengler et al. study, the effects from 75 clinical judgment studies spanning the years 
1970 to 1996 were meta-analyzed.  Spengler et al. found a small, but reliable effect 
demonstrating a positive correlation between experience and judgment accuracy.  They 
noted a 13 percent increase (d = .12) in clinicians’ decision-making accuracy with more 
experience, regardless of other factors.  While this finding was more hopeful than what 
was previously found in narrative reviews of experience and judgment accuracy, it did 
not reflect an overwhelming improvement in judgment accuracy as a function of 
experience.  Spengler et al. stated, “Given the amount of time, money, effort, and training 
required for clinicians, the present findings suggest that they do not receive much 
‘payoff’ or benefit for their cost” (p. 35). 
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The discussion of the explicit teaching of clinical judgment skills has continued 
since the Spengler et al. (1995) article.  Grove (2001) commented on an American 
Psychological Association Division 12 Task Force study, in which the importance of 
teaching clinical judgment in training programs was second only to the teaching of 
ethical and legal standards.  Lilienfeld et al. (2003) have stated that in order to receive 
accreditation by the American Psychological Association, graduate training programs 
should be required to provide formal education in the area of clinical decision-making.  
Although there has been steady publication of literature emphasizing the importance of 
sound clinical judgment skills, it seems the impact on training programs and clinicians’ 
actual judgment-making behaviors has been scarce.  In an attempt to investigate how 
much academic time is actually dedicated to the explicit teaching of clinical judgment 
skills, however, Harding (2007) examined courses from APA accredited programs as 
well as surveys completed by academic training directors.  The findings from the Harding 
study are disappointing given the assertions about the importance of the teaching of 
clinical judgment skills.  Although academic training directors agreed upon the 
importance of possessing effective clinical decision-making skills, greater than 70 
percent admitted their programs were in need of more explicit instruction on the topic.  
Harding also found that actual course content and program literature indicated less focus 
on the teaching of clinical judgment and decision-making skills than was suggested by 
survey responses from the academic training directors.  In general, it seems the calls for 
reform in the way clinical judgment skills are taught and enacted in actual practice have 
been largely ignored. 
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 An update and extension of the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis will allow for 
the examination of additional moderator variables as compared to those drawn from the 
Spengler et al. study.  In individual studies allowing for examination of the relation 
between experience and judgment accuracy, few studies included analyses of the 
moderating or mediating effects of additional variables.  Oftentimes the experience-
accuracy relation was presented in supplementary or post-hoc analyses, decreasing the 
likelihood of in-depth examination of moderating or mediating variables of the effect.  In 
other studies, the experience-accuracy relation was presented as the primary analysis, but 
likewise relatively few impacting variables were assessed.  For example, in Brammer 
(2002), the number of diagnostic questions asked by the clinicians was assessed as a 
mediating variable of the experience-accuracy relation.  In Witteman and van den 
Bercken (2007), the experience-accuracy effect was assessed in relation to the impact of 
the type of case presented (i.e., child, adult) and the experience level of the clinicians 
(i.e., novice, intermediate, experienced).  In the present study, two moderator variables 
are assessed as compared to the Spengler et al. meta-analysis.  Profession type was 
assessed as a moderator variable in the present meta-analysis in order to explore the 
possibility of its impact on the experience-accuracy effect.  Profession type referred to the 
subfield of mental health from which the clinician sample was drawn, for example social 
work, psychiatry, and psychology.  Although the Spengler et al. meta-analysis did not 
analyze profession type as a moderator, it is reasonable to examine whether or not 
various mental health professionals learn differently from experience.  Profession type 
has implications for the type of training mental health professionals undergo in relation to 
the formulation of clinical judgments.  Specifically, various mental health professions 
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may emphasize different epistemologies in both training and clinical practice.  These 
various epistemologies may influence how the clinicians accumulate knowledge and 
improve their judgment-making skills throughout their careers.  
In addition to profession type, the inclusion of non-mental health participants was 
newly addressed as a moderator variable.  Spengler et al. (2009) addressed studies in 
which mental health clinicians were compared to each other in relation to their judgment 
accuracy; therefore, the lowest level of training in the sample pertained to first-year 
graduate students in the mental health field.  As stated by Lambert and Ogles (2004), 
psychotherapy meta-analyses often address studies in which the relative levels of 
experience between untrained and trained psychotherapists are quite small.  Relatively 
fewer studies, such as Goldberg (1959), explored greater experience ranges in relation to 
judgment accuracy.  Goldberg, in particular, asked staff psychologists, psychology 
trainees, and hospital secretaries to make diagnostic judgments of brain damage based 
upon Bender-Gestalt protocols of 15 organic and 15 nonorganic patients.  In his review, 
Garb (1998) commented that experts are no more accurate than less experienced 
clinicians and clinicians are not found to be more accurate than graduate students; 
however, clinicians may be more accurate than beginning graduate students and also 
more accurate than laypeople. To demonstrate the effect of training and experience on 
judgment accuracy utilizing a relatively wide experience range, Lambert and Wertheimer 
compared undergraduates, graduate students, and paraprofessionals in their ability to 
accurately diagnose psychopathology based on client case histories.  These groups were 
divided into three groups according to their education level (i.e., no education, low 
education, and moderate education) as well as three experience groups (i.e., no 
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experience, low experience, and moderate experience).  Case histories were constructed 
with adherence to DSM-IV criteria.  Results revealed positive experience-accuracy 
effects, with those in the low education group performing significantly better than those 
in the no education group.  In addition, those in the moderate education performed 
significantly better than the low and no education groups.  In regards to the experience 
groups, those in the low experience group performed slightly better than the no 
experience group.  However, those in the moderate experience group performed 
significantly better than the low education and no education groups.  Lambert and 
Wertheimer concluded that the inclusion of lower levels of training and experience 
resulted in the larger, positive experience-accuracy effect.  These findings and comments 
suggest that in order to maximize the finding of a larger, statistically significant positive 
correlation between experience and accuracy, or performance in the case of the 
psychotherapy research cited by Lambert and Ogles, there needs to be a relatively large 
range in the experience levels of the participants.  Lambert & Wertheimer (1988) 
addressed the problem of restricted range in clinical judgment research, stating “Even if 
there is a strong relationship between training or experience and diagnostic accuracy, that 
relationship may not be detectable if all the participants in a study are selected from a 
group that already has a substantial amount of training and experience” (p. 50).  The 
exclusion of studies in which undergraduates and non-mental health professionals were 
compared to mental health clinicians in Spengler et al. may have resulted in difficulty 
capturing the larger overall effect.  Unlike the Spengler et al. meta-analysis, the present 
meta-analysis included studies in which non-mental health clinicians are compared to 
mental health clinicians (i.e., those with at least some graduate level training in a mental 
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health field).  It is expected that this inclusion will maximize the finding of the positive 
experience-accuracy effect. 
Moreover, an update and expansion of the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis 
will allow for cross-validation of the Spengler meta-analysis.  Due to the presence of only 
one available meta-analysis examining the experience-judgment accuracy effect, cross-
validation of this meta-analysis will be a beneficial contribution to the clinical judgment 
research.  An update will provide a test of robustness of the Spengler et al. findings using 
current research.  It is hypothesized that the present meta-analysis will reveal a modest, 
positive correlation between judgment accuracy and experience based upon the findings 
of the Spengler et al. meta-analysis as well as an inclusion of additional moderator 
variables. 
Spengler et al. (2009) examined several moderator variables, which will also be 
analyzed in the present study in order to test the robustness of their findings.  Original 
moderators based upon the Spengler et al. meta-analysis included experience type, 
experience breadth, type of judgment, criterion validity, provision of feedback, 
publication source, ecological validity of method of study, ecological validity of stimulus, 
study quality, and age of study.  Additional moderator variables include profession type 
(psychology, psychiatry, nursing, social work, or combination) and inclusion of non-
mental health participants (yes, no). 
Experience type was divided into three categories: clinical, educational, or both. 
According to Spengler et al. (2009), experience type was not found to make a significant 
impact on judgment accuracy.  This is consistent with the multitude of findings 
demonstrating nonsignificant and negative findings regarding the relationship between 
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judgment accuracy and experience (e.g., Goldberg, 1959; Highlen & Hill, 1984; Kirk & 
Hsieh, 2004; Silverman, 1959; Witteman & van den Bercken, 2007).  These studies 
employed a variety of operational definitions of experience, including clinical and 
educational.  For the present study, it is therefore hypothesized that experience type will 
not have a statistically significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect. 
Experience breadth was divided into three categories: general, specific, and both. 
According to Spengler et al. (2009), specificity of experience did not impact the 
experience-accuracy effect.  Popular opinion holds that having specific or specialized 
training or experience in a particular area would result in better judgment making in that 
area.  Some research has supported this claim (Fairman, Drevetz, Kreisman, & 
Teitelbaum, 1998; Goldstein, Deysach, & Kleinknecht, 1973).  However, other research 
has suggested having specialized training or experience merely leads to more confidence 
in related tasks.  In addition, research on experts in psychology has found that experts 
often form judgments based on a priori schemata regarding the presenting problem and 
that while their judgments are often more automatic and made with greater confidence, 
they are not always more accurate (Eells et al., 2005; Goldberg, 1959; Witteman & van 
den Bercken, 2007).  For the present study, it is hypothesized that experience breadth will 
not make a statistically significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect. 
Judgment type made refers to the kind of judgment participants were required to 
make and could be defined as problem type, hit rate, treatment, severity, prognosis, 
problem recall, other, or combined. In the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, it was 
found that more experienced clinicians showed greater diagnostic accuracy, were more 
accurate at formulating appropriate treatment recommendations, and more accurately 
Meta-analysis 58 
 
recalled problems.  Additionally, the “other” category revealed a moderate effect with 
more experienced clinicians making more accurate judgments.  One could speculate that 
these categories offer more clear-cut guidelines for decision-making than would 
judgments of severity and prognosis.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that the present study 
will find statistically significant moderator effects for type of judgment made, with more 
experienced clinicians showing better accuracy in diagnosis, formulating treatment 
recommendations, and recalling problems. 
Criterion validity could be categorized as low, high, or both and refers to how the 
standard for judgment accuracy was established.  For example, Yeo et al. (2001) asked 
participants to provide ratings of clients’ problem type based upon clinical vignettes.  
They were provided with several problem type choices, including stress, depression, 
schizophrenia/paranoid schizophrenia, mania, anxiety, physical weakness, mental 
weakness, being possessed, and ‘other.’  Due to the lack of standardized diagnostic 
choices as well as the lack of a priori validation methods (i.e., pilot study to validate 
clinical vignettes), this included study was considered to have low criterion validity.  
Contrary to expectations, Spengler et al. (2009) found that studies with low criterion 
validity resulted in higher effect sizes.  This is consistent with findings that experts’ 
knowledge is organized into broader and complex memory structures, allowing them to 
make connections between seemingly irreconcilable concepts (Hinsley et al., 1978).  
Additionally, it has been found that experts view problems according to their 
fundamental principles or underlying structures, as opposed to novices who focus more 
on superficial characteristics (Chi et al., 1981; Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Haerem & 
Rau, 2007).  These characteristics could aid more experienced clinicians in their 
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assessments of problems with “fuzzy” criteria.  Novices, on the other hand, may 
demonstrate poorer performance with low criterion validity tasks due to their tendencies 
to focus more on the details.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that the present study will find 
a statistically significant moderator effect, with more experienced clinicians 
outperforming less experienced clinicians when the judgment tasks reflect low criterion 
validity. 
Provision of feedback was categorized dichotomously (i.e., yes or no) and refers 
to whether or not feedback was provided to participants relevant to the judgment task.  
The lack of direct feedback in psychological practice has long been emphasized by 
scholars and researchers as one of the major reasons judgment accuracy has not been 
shown to improve with greater experience (Dawes et al., 1989; Garb & Boyle, 2003; 
Lichtenberg, 1997).  However, it is also noted that not all feedback is equally valid and 
useful to the clinician making the judgment.  Oftentimes, the feedback clinicians receive 
is not based on objective assessments of their performance but involves bias and 
pseudoscience perspectives on the part of the individual providing the feedback 
(Lilienfeld, et al., 2003). In the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, only two studies 
were found that addressed feedback (deMesquita, 1992; Horner, Guyer, & Kalter, 1993).  
They concluded that feedback had not played a significant role in the experience-
accuracy effect.  Based on initial reviews of studies to be included in the present meta-
analysis, it is expected that the ability to test this hypothesis will be limited based on the 
few studies found that provided feedback to the participants.  However, it is hypothesized 
that feedback will not show a statistically significant impact on the experience-accuracy 
effect. 
Meta-analysis 60 
 
Publication source could be categorized as APA journal, another psychology 
journal, psychiatry or medical journal, or dissertation.  It has been noted that publication 
bias exists and can skew the results of meta-analysis if not accounted for.  Specifically, 
larger effect sizes are found for published journal articles in comparison to unpublished 
studies, theses, or dissertations (Kurosawa, 1984; Light & Pillemer, 1984; Peters, Sutton, 
Jones, Abrams, & Rushton, 2006; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989). Spengler et al. (2009) 
tested this moderator and found that studies published in non-APA psychology journals 
reported much smaller effects than those found in APA journals.  It is therefore 
hypothesized that studies published in APA journals will reveal greater effects than those 
in non-APA journals. 
Ecological validity of method of study could be categorized as analogue, archival, 
or in vivo and refers to the way in which material was presented to the participants.  
According to the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, the ecological validity did not 
make a significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect.  Likewise, it is hypothesized 
that the present study’s findings will not reveal a statistically significant impact on the 
experience-accuracy effect. 
Ecological validity of stimulus could be categorized as direct, indirect, or both and 
refers to the method used for the stimulus presentation. The Spengler et al. (2009) meta-
analysis reported that neither direct nor indirect presentation of the stimulus played a 
significant role in judgment accuracy.  It is hypothesized that the present study will reveal 
similar findings. 
Relation of experience to the research design could be categorized as not in 
design, in primary design, in supplementary analysis, and multiple, and referred to 
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whether or not experience was included as a component of the primary research design.  
In quantitative research, supplementary analyses often capitalize on chance, inflating the 
size of the effect (Keppel, Saufley, & Tokunaga, 1992).  They are considered to be 
opportunistic and, if not controlled for through the use of techniques such as the Tukey 
test (Tukey, 1953) or the Scheffé test (Scheffé, 1953), can lead to distortion of or 
overemphasis on unplanned significant effects.  Studies could be coded as not in the 
research design when the researchers did not include an analysis of experience in either 
the primary design, supplementary analysis, or in multiple parts of the design.  These 
studies required extrapolation of the data from tables or from descriptions as well as 
reorganization of the data to fit the present meta-analysis format.  In addition, “not in 
design” studies could be coded for studies whose authors required contact to obtain the 
necessary experience comparisons and data.  For example, Hannan et al. (2005) 
examined clinicians’ abilities to accurately detect treatment failure.  One author from this 
study was contacted to obtain the necessary data for the experience variable due to the 
experience variable not being included or reported in the research design.  Spengler et al. 
(2009) found no statistically significant impact of relation of experience to the research 
design on the experience-accuracy effect.  Likewise, it is expected that the present study 
will find similar results. 
Experience as a major variable could be categorized dichotomously (i.e., yes or 
no) and referred to the inclusion of experience as a conceptual or theoretical variable of 
importance in the original plan of the study.  When not conceived as theoretical variables 
of importance, the examined variables in a given study may result in larger, more 
spurious effects (Keppel et al., 1992).  As found in the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-
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analysis, it is hypothesized that the present study’s findings will not find a statistically 
significant difference based on whether or not experience was included as a major 
variable of importance. 
Study quality could be categorized either as acceptable, good, or excellent and 
refers to the subjective rating of overall methods and analyses.  The impact of study 
quality on meta-analysis is important in that meta-analysis cannot correct for studies with 
serious flaws (Eysenck, 1994). In the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, study quality 
was not found to be a significant moderating variable.  It is hypothesized that the present 
study will reveal similar findings. 
Profession type could be categorized as psychology, psychiatry, nursing, social 
work, or a combination.  Within the mental health profession, there may be significant 
differences in training and experiences based on the specific profession addressed that 
affect the clinicians’ abilities to learn from experience.  At a basic level, various 
profession types emphasize different etiologies of pathology as well as varying aspects of 
presenting problems.  Although the profession types of the clinicians may impact their 
judgment accuracy throughout their careers, empirical support was not found for a 
significant relation between certain profession types and judgment accuracy.  Therefore, 
no specific hypothesis was formed regarding profession type and its impact on the 
experience-accuracy effect. 
Inclusion of non-mental health participants could be coded dichotomously as 
“yes” or “no.”  The Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis excluded studies based upon 
comparisons between non-mental health participants and mental health clinicians if 
analysis solely within the mental health clinician group was not conducted in the original 
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study.  However, the inclusion of non-mental health participants may achieve a greater 
range of experience and will allow for comparisons to be made when the baseline level of 
experience for participants is significantly lower than that of the mental health clinicians. 
According to Lambert and Wertheimer (1988), the failure of many studies to reveal a 
positive experience-accuracy effect may in fact be due to the efficacy of graduate-level 
training.  In other words, after reaching a certain level of graduate status, these less 
experienced students may perform at a similar accuracy rate as compared to more 
experienced clinicians.  Unless studies incorporate relatively large experience ranges (i.e., 
undergraduates versus experienced clinicians), the experience-accuracy effect may be 
diminished. In his review, Garb (1998) noted the greatest differences in judgment 
accuracy seemed to be found when the experience range of the participants in question 
was considerably large, such as when the judgment accuracy of laypeople or first-year 
graduate students was compared to that of highly experienced clinicians.  In Spengler et 
al., the typical study included in the meta-analysis focused on small to moderates ranges 
of experience.  In fact, Lambert and Wertheimer was included in the Spengler et al. meta-
analysis and revealed one of the largest experience-accuracy effects.  The problem of 
restricted range is common in behavioral psychology research, resulting in 
underestimations of relations between variables.  For example, if a researcher aims to 
examine the correlation between intelligence and political affiliations, he or she will 
encounter the problem of restricted range if the sample includes only undergraduates.  It 
is likely that individuals in a university setting will have average to above average IQ 
scores, precluding the researcher from addressing individuals with lower IQ in relation to 
their political affiliations.  In clinical judgment research, it is common for studies to 
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incorporate restricted ranges of experience (Lambert and Wertheimer), precluding 
researchers from generalizing findings beyond the particular experience range examined 
in the study.  It is hypothesized that studies in which non-mental health participants are 
included will show significantly larger experience-accuracy effects. 
Publication year will be categorized as the exact year of publication of each 
study.  Publication year was addressed in the present meta-analysis in order to examine 
possible differences in the experience-accuracy effect based on when the study was 
published.  As discussed previously in this chapter, important contributions in the clinical 
judgment literature have occurred since the time of the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-
analysis, specifically Garb’s (1998) review of clinician factors impacting clinical 
judgment as well as APA’s calls for more explicit emphasis on fostering clinical 
judgment skills in training programs (Grove, 2001).  However, it is difficult to gauge the 
actual impact these contributions have had in clinical practice through research studies, 
especially when the utilization of survey methods introduce social desirability bias 
(Harding, 2007).  As found in Spengler et al., it is hypothesized that publication year will 
not have a significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the empirical findings in the areas of research related to 
clinical judgment and experience research.  These areas included the distinction between 
experience and expertise, unique characteristics of expert performance, investigations of 
client variable biases and heuristics, and a summary of the research evaluating the 
relationship between clinical experience and judgment accuracy.  Additionally, this 
section provided an overview on the limitations of traditional narrative reviews.  Finally, 
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a rationale was provided as to why an update and expansion of the Spengler et al. (2009) 
meta-analysis is important.  Similar to the findings of the Spengler et al. meta-analysis, it 
is hypothesized that the present study will reveal a small, positive effect, indicating a 
slight increase in judgment accuracy in relation to experience.  With the exceptions of 
type of judgment, criterion validity, publication source, and inclusion of non-mental 
health participants, it is hypothesized that the remaining moderator variables will not 
significantly impact the experience-accuracy effect.  In the following chapter, research 
methodology is discussed that will allow the present study to address these hypotheses.
  
Chapter 3: Methods 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research methods that were used for 
the present study.  In this chapter, study search and selection are discussed and a 
description of the coding procedures utilized is provided.  Also, important terms and 
variables are defined and operationalized, such as the main variables of judgment 
accuracy and experience as well as the moderator variables. Finally, meta-analysis 
methodology is discussed in greater detail, with a focus on effect size as the unit of 
measurement and the use of the random effects model for the purposes of the present 
study. 
Study search 
As part of the more comprehensive MACJ project, Spengler et al. (2009) 
evaluated studies from 1970 to 1996 that addressed the relationship between experience 
and judgment accuracy.  A study search was conducted using electronic databases, 
including PsychINFO, ERIC, Dissertation Abstracts, MEDLINE, and Social Science 
Index. For the MACJ project, 35,000 studies were initially identified and reviewed for 
inclusion.  Subsequent to review, 4,617 studies were chosen that addressed some type of 
judgment, either distinctively or possibly mental health-related or mental health-related.  
Upon coding these 4,617 studies for their content, 1,135 studies met the initial inclusion 
criteria described later in this chapter.  Only 316 of the 1,135 identified could be coded 
for the experience variable.  Moreover, only 106 of the 316 studies established a standard 
for judgment accuracy.  Finally, 75 studies remained that included sufficient statistical 
data necessary to calculate effect sizes.   
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The present study used the same electronic databases as in Spengler et al. (2009) 
with the exclusion of BRS, which had dissolved by the time of the present meta-analysis 
search. Moreover, the same search terms were used as in the Spengler et al. meta-analysis 
and applied to studies from 1997 to 2010 (see Appendix A).  For each database, limiters 
were set to prevent the inclusion of editorials, comments, replies, book chapters, and 
studies conducted with non-human subjects in the search retrieval.  When necessary, 
customer support for the databases was sought to confirm the utilization of the specific 
limiters in question for the purposes of the present meta-analysis.  These limiters greatly 
reduced the number of articles retrieved for each search term to those that involved 
empirical studies of varying research designs.  At two stages, the search was expanded by 
searching for related studies in reference sections as well as searching for studies cited by 
the original studies found (i.e., forward and backward cross-referencing).  Forward 
referencing was carried out with the 75 included studies of the Spengler et al. meta-
analysis.  Additionally, forward and backward cross-referencing was implemented with 
the final 37 studies selected for the present meta-analysis.  This resulted in the return of 
many of the same studies that were previously reviewed in the first stages of the search 
process. 
For the present meta-analysis, 7,789 studies were initially identified using the 
search terms in the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis as well as the search limiters (see 
Appendix B).  Of these 7,789 studies, 862 were chosen that were believed to address 
some type of mental health judgment accuracy task (e.g., diagnostic decision-making, 
violence risk assessment, prediction of treatment failure) as identified in their titles and 
further confirmed with their abstracts.  This screening for judgment accuracy studies 
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resulted in the exclusion of studies that clearly examined judgments for which there was 
no standard for accuracy, for example studies of judgment bias, judgment processes, and 
studies in which mental health clinicians were surveyed regarding their attitudes towards 
various client populations and problems.  The remaining 862 studies were located and 
obtained through various methods, which included downloading electronic copies, 
ordering electronic copies through Interlibrary Loan, seeking out hard copies of articles 
and dissertations, and purchasing electronic copies of dissertations.  In the next step of 
the search process, studies were reviewed to ensure they included at least one group of 
mental health professionals in their participant sample.  This step resulted in the 
exclusion of studies whose sole participant base were undergraduates, medical 
professionals (i.e., those without mental health training), or those in unrelated professions 
(e.g., chemists, school principals, police detectives).  The remaining 302 studies were 
further subjected to the inclusion criteria outlined later in this section.  Upon meeting 
inclusion criteria, 85 studies were then coded for their content.  From these 85 studies, 50 
were confirmed as establishing a standard for judgment accuracy.  Only 37 of these 
studies, however, included sufficient statistical data to calculate effect sizes.  In some 
cases, the authors of the studies were contacted to obtain the necessary statistical data for 
the included studies.   
Study selection 
In the included studies for both the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis as well as 
the present meta-analysis, experience was defined as either clinical, educational, or both.  
Studies focused on mental health issues and involved clinical judgment, clinical judgment 
bias, or clinical versus statistical prediction.  The types of judgment being made in the 
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studies were related to problem type, hit rate, treatment, problem severity, prognosis, or 
problem recall.  Moreover, studies that included some measure of judgment accuracy 
were included, although the measures, or benchmarks, utilized for the judgment accuracy 
task reflected varying degrees of criterion validity.  Additionally, included studies were 
required to investigate at least two groups for comparison of experience and judgment 
accuracy relationships or a first-order correlation of judgment accuracy and experience.  
The mental health judges included professionals working in various fields, such as 
psychology, psychiatry, social work, counseling (mental health, school, rehabilitation, 
and pastoral), and psychiatric nursing.  Studies evaluating graduate students in these 
fields were also included.  Unlike the Spengler et al. meta-analysis, studies including 
undergraduate students and/or professionals in other fields were also admitted as long as 
these groups were compared to at least one of the previously mentioned groups of mental 
health clinicians.  Included studies were also required to provide the data necessary to 
calculate effect sizes.  If a study did not report sufficient data to calculate the necessary 
effect size, the authors were contacted and asked to provide the necessary data. 
Coding 
Studies were coded for variables related to study characteristics and statistics.  An 
original coding form created for the present study was utilized that allowed for the 
recording of moderator variables (see Appendix C).  In addition, a coding form from the 
MACJ Project (Spengler et al., 2009) meta-analysis was utilized that allowed for the 
recording of statistical data (see Appendix D).  Since the present study examined only 
one of the sub-analyses of the MACJ (i.e., effect of experience on judgment accuracy), 
fewer variables were coded in comparison to Spengler et al. 
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In terms of study characteristics, the Moderator Coding Sheet (see Appendix C) 
was used to code for variables related to the experience type, experience breadth, 
judgment type, criterion validity, provision of feedback, publication source, method of 
study, validity of stimulus, relation of experience to design, experience as a major 
variable, study quality, profession type, inclusion of non-mental health participants, and 
publication year.  In order to ensure coding was performed with adherence to 
predetermined guidelines and criteria, two raters selected and coded all included studies 
using the Moderator Coding Sheet.  The second rater was a third-year graduate student in 
school psychology who received prior training from the author on the use of the coding 
sheets.  Cohen’s kappa was calculated to determine interrater reliability since it is a 
relatively conservative measure of agreement, especially when used in tasks with many 
categorical variables (Cohen, 1960).  Coding discrepancies were discussed with the 
doctoral committee chairperson for further clarification and resolution. 
Cohen’s kappa was calculated for 13 categories across all 37 included studies.  
Kappa ratings ranged from .71 to .96, indicating substantial agreement to almost perfect 
agreement according to Landis and Koch (1977).  While these subjective labels are by no 
means universally agreed-upon, they assist in providing a more informative examination 
of the individual kappa ratings.  Table 1 displays the kappa ratings achieved for each 
coding category using the Moderator Coding Sheet. 
In relation to statistics, studies were coded using the Metrics Coding Sheet, 
created for the Spengler et al. meta-analysis (see Appendix D).  The Metrics Coding 
Sheet allowed for coding of the statistical relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables, whether that was in the form of means and standard deviations, 
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correlation coefficients, hit rate percentages, odds ratios, F and t distributions, or chi-
square distributions.  For the dependent variables, the more general terms were recorded 
first (e.g., problem type) with more specific definitions provided in parentheses (e.g., 
judgment of neurological impairment versus no impairment).  Likewise for the  
independent variable, more specific definitions (e.g., years of clinical experience) 
followed the more general term (e.g., experience).  Once the statistical relationship 
between judgment accuracy and experience was recorded, it was necessary to determine 
the direction of the effect, if possible.  Additionally, the rater was prompted to code level 
of confidence in the rating of accuracy (low versus high).  Finally, a global rating of 
methods and analyses employed by the individual study was coded (poor, adequate, or 
excellent).  The final two items of metrics coding, level of confidence in rating of 
accuracy and global rating of methods/analyses, called for subjective judgments to be 
made on the part of the rater.  The level of confidence in rating of accuracy item involved 
judging whether or not the individual study employed standards for accuracy that were 
clearly defined, objective, and validated in some way (e.g., a priori predictions of 
violence compared with actual violence recorded on a standardized measure).  The global 
rating of methods/analyses item involved use of Cook and Campbell’s (1979) discussion 
of threats to internal and external validity. 
Definitions of terms 
 Independent measure: Experience.  For the present study, the term experience 
was operationalized similarly to the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis.  Experience 
encompassed both clinical and educational.  Clinical experience referred to number of 
clients seen, number of tests administered, time of counseling experience, job setting, or 
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others.  Educational experience referred to number of graduate courses taken, year in 
graduate training, level of training, amount of face-to-face clinical supervision, training 
intervention, or others.  In addition, experience could be general, specific, or both.  
General experience referred to the type of experience gained as part of core training and 
common tasks as a mental health clinician.  Specific experience, in contrast, referred to 
the type of experience gained that would be of specific use for the judgment task in 
question. These differences in types of experience were reflected in the included studies.  
For example, Falvey et al. (2005) operationalized experience as number of years the 
clinicians have worked in the field as well as their exposure to clients with a diagnosis of 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.  The first type was considered general clinical 
experience and the second was considered specific clinical experience.  In Monsen and 
Frederickson (2002), on the other hand, experience was defined as a specific training 
intervention in interviewing and case formulation techniques for school psychologist 
trainees.  This was considered specific educational experience. 
 Dependent measure: Judgment accuracy.  Judgment accuracy, likewise, was 
defined and operationalized in many different ways.  For the present study, like in the 
Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, judgment accuracy referred to the validity of 
clinicians’ judgments related to various constructs, such as problem type, hit rate, 
treatment, severity, prognosis, problem recall, or others.  Studies varied in the measures 
and in the quality of measures used to evaluate judgment accuracy.  For example, in Garb 
and Boyle (2003), 25 neuropsychologists were provided with two sets of written case 
material and asked to make judgments of neurological impairment and dementia if 
applicable.  The written case material included neuropsychological test protocols based 
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on the average scores for community dwelling 38-year-old and 74-year old individuals.  
Since the test scores were strictly based upon the average performances of a 38-year-old 
and 74-year-old, it would have been difficult for clinicians to justify making judgments of 
neurological impairment or dementia.  Any judgments made of neurological impairment 
or dementia could confidently be said to reflect errors in judgment.  While this method 
provided a relatively objective measure of clinicians’ judgment accuracy, other studies 
employed methods in which the standards for accuracy were more difficult to determine.  
Monsen and Frederickson (2002) assessed school psychologist trainees both before and 
after a specialized training session in the use of accessible reasoning techniques during 
school consultations with teachers.  One of the outcomes on which school psychologist 
trainees were assessed, judgment accuracy, was defined as “the degree to which the 
aspects identified by the participants were based upon the facts of the case, as opposed to 
including errors such as over-generalization and speculative inference” (Monsen & 
Frederickson, p. 204).  The trainees’ judgment accuracy was assessed by the first author 
and cross-validated by two tutors “experienced in assessing written problem 
understanding” (p. 204).  In this study, the standard for judgment accuracy was relatively 
difficult to determine, as it relied on the subjective judgments of the study’s author as 
well as two others rather than comparison to some type of objective standard.  Judgment 
accuracy, however operationalized, was evaluated for criterion validity as in the Spengler 
et al. study. 
Moderator variables 
Experience type reflected the specific kind of experience addressed in the study, 
whether that was clinical, educational, or both.  Clinical experience could refer to number 
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of clients seen, number of tests administered, time of counseling experience, job setting, 
or others. Educational experience could refer to number of graduate courses taken, year 
in graduate training, level of training, amount of face-to-face clinical supervision, training 
intervention, or others.  Brammer (2002) included years of experience as well as level of 
training (i.e., master’s, doctorate) into the estimation of a participant’s amount of 
experience.  In the case of the Brammer study, the focus on the level of training the 
participants had received would fall into the category of educational experience.  
Brammer also addressed the clinical experience of the participants by recording the 
number of years the participants had worked in the field.  It was possible for studies, as 
was the case in Brammer, to include both educational and clinical types of experiences. 
 Experience breadth referred to whether the study addressed general and/or 
specific experience.  General experience could be addressed by studies reporting on 
clinicians’ general level of training or years of experience in the mental health field, for 
example.  Specific experience, in contrast, could be addressed by studies reporting on 
participants’ specific experiences or training related to the type of judgment task being 
studied.  For example, Falvey et al. (2005) reported on clinicians’ previous exposure to 
similar cases as the ones presented to them in the study.  However, other researchers 
simply reported on clinicians’ years of experience working in the mental health field 
(e.g., Witteman & van den Bercken, 2007). 
 Judgment type referred to the kind of judgment participants were required to 
make, such as problem type, hit rate, treatment severity, prognosis, problem recall, other, 
or combined.  Brammer (2002), for example, asked clinicians to make diagnostic 
decisions after they utilized an artificial intelligence program that simulated a clinical 
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interview.  This type of judgment fell under the category of problem type.  Problem recall 
pertained to studies in which clinicians were asked to recall clients’ presenting problems.  
Dawson, Zeitz, and Wright (1989), for example, asked novice and experienced clinicians 
to make judgments based upon multiple observations of children’s behaviors with 
varying degrees of aggression.  One specific judgment type addressed by this particular 
study was problem recall, in which the clinicians were rated on the amount of 
information they correctly recalled from the behavior observations. 
 Criterion validity referred to the rating of high, low, or both based on how the 
standard for judgment accuracy was established.  High criterion validity was noted when 
the researchers included standards for accuracy that were highly valid or objective.  For 
example, Witteman and van den Bercken (2007) required participants to make diagnostic 
decisions based on preexisting, standardized case studies included in the DSM-IV Case 
Book.  Members of the APA DSM Task Force and Work Group as well as groups of 
advisers and consultants wrote the cases.  Less objective methods of judging accuracy, 
for example utilizing a panel of “expert” judges (Brammer, 2002), reflected low criterion 
validity since there was much more room for disagreement among judges who had no 
part in the writing of the case studies and had not already been members of an organized 
professional group. 
Provision of feedback referred to whether or not feedback was provided to the 
participants of the study at some point in their judgment processes.  This moderator was 
coded only if judgment accuracy was measured before and after the provision of 
feedback or if various feedback conditions were measured between groups in relation to 
judgment accuracy. 
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 Publication source referred to the original location of the study, in other words an 
APA journal, another psychology journal, a psychiatry or medical journal, or if the study 
was a dissertation.   
 Ecological validity of method of study referred to the way in which material was 
presented to the participants to obtain judgments and could be categorized as analogue, 
archival, or in vivo.  For example, in some studies participants were presented with case 
studies of fictitious clients (e.g., Brammer, 2002), while in other studies, live client 
scenarios were used or simulated (e.g., Hickling et al., 2002).  In the former study, the 
analogue method was used while an in vivo method was used in the latter. 
 Ecological validity of stimulus referred to the method used for the presentation of 
material and could be categorized as directly experienced, indirectly experienced, or both.  
In other words, participants could experience the material directly, for example via 
videotape, role-playing, or live presentation, or the participants could experience the 
material indirectly, for example through written case studies or test protocols. 
 Relation of experience to the research design referred to whether or not 
experience was not in the design, part of the primary design, part of the supplementary 
analysis, or in multiple areas. 
 Experience as a major variable referred to whether or not experience was 
conceived as a major theoretical variable of importance.  Experience as a major variable 
was also coded if the study made specific a priori hypotheses in regards to the effects of 
experience. 
 Study quality referred to the overall quality assigned to each study.  Studies were 
judged as acceptable, good, or excellent.  Decisions about study quality included the 
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study’s design, execution, and analysis.  Cook and Campbell’s (1979) review of research 
methods and design offered guidelines for judging overall study quality. 
 Profession type referred to the specific profession of the mental health clinician, 
whether that is psychology, psychiatry, nursing, social work, or a combination.  For 
example, Jopp (2001) included clinicians in the field of psychology and was therefore 
coded as, “psychology.” This moderator reflected only the mental health clinicians, 
meaning those with at least graduate-level experience. 
 Inclusion of non-mental health participants referred to the inclusion of 
participants not in the mental health field (i.e., the inclusion of undergraduates or other 
non-mental health professionals) in comparison to mental health clinicians in terms of 
judgment accuracy.  Non-mental health participants included undergraduates, other 
professionals, or a combination.  Studies were coded as “yes” or “no” depending on 
whether or not non-mental health participants were compared to participants with at least 
some graduate training in a mental health field.   
 Publication year referred to the exact year of publication.
  
Chapter 4: Results 
 
From the initial database of 7,789 studies identified using the search terms, 85 
met the criteria for study selection and were coded using the Moderator Coding Sheet 
(Appendix C) and Metrics Coding Sheet (Appendix D).  However, only 37 contained 
sufficient statistical data to warrant inclusion in the meta-analysis.  Analysis of the data 
included several steps.  First, a random effects model was chosen based upon previously 
established goals and limitations of the present study’s findings.  Following this model, 
the meta-analysis was conducted with the effect size data from the individual studies.  
After examining the overall weighted mean effect size, tests for homogeneity of the 
overall effect were conducted using Hedges’ (1982) Q.  Moderator analyses were then 
performed to explore the impact of the following variables on the experience-accuracy 
effect: (a) experience type, (b) experience breadth, (c) judgment type, (d) criterion 
validity for accuracy dependent measure, (e) provision of feedback, (f) publication 
source, (g) ecological validity of the method of study, (h), ecological validity of stimulus, 
(i) relation of experience to the research design, (j) experience as a major variable, (k) 
study quality, (l) profession type, (m) inclusion of non-mental health participants, and (n) 
publication year. 
Random effects model 
A random effects model was used for the meta-analysis.  According to Sánchez-
Meca and Marín-Martinez (2008), the random effects model has been favored in recent 
years over the fixed effects model due to its more realistic assumptions of how 
correlations occur.  Specifically, the random effects model explicitly accounts for 
heterogeneity because the model assumes a different underlying effect for each study and 
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takes this into consideration as an additional source of variation.  The weights in a 
random effects model are more evenly distributed than those in a fixed effects model.  
Additionally, the confidence intervals in a random effects model are wider than those in a 
fixed effects model (Hunter & Schmidt, 2000).  Moreover, a random effects model was 
used because it assumes there is a population of effect sizes from which the studies drawn 
are a random sample (Hedges & Vevea, 1998).  A random effects model was used for the 
present study due to the high amount of variation observed in how variables of 
importance were measured, specifically the measurement of experience and judgment 
accuracy.  In addition, this model was chosen based upon the assumption that the studies 
identified were only a sample of the population of relevant studies.  In Spengler et al. 
(2009), 35,000 studies were reviewed over a period of several years to find relevant 
studies for inclusion.  The research team ensured every relevant study was identified by 
examining entire articles for experience-accuracy analyses.  In contrast, the present meta-
analysis employed a search strategy in which two raters reviewed the initial 7,789 studies 
identified via their titles and abstracts.  If abstracts did not identify analyses of mental 
health judgments in which standards for accuracy could reasonably be inferred, further 
review of the studies was not conducted.  Due to the longer time frame and utilization of 
a large team of raters to search for and locate relevant studies, the Spengler et al. meta-
analysis utilized a fixed effects model.  Since it could be confidently stated that every 
clinical judgment study was located, a fixed effects model allowed Spengler et al. to 
make conditional inferences based upon the located studies. 
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Calculation of effect sizes 
A total of 190 separate effect sizes were inputted into Comprehensive Meta-
Analysis, Version 2 (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005) to assist in 
conducting the meta-analysis.  This software allows the researcher to input the individual 
data from each study in over 100 formats (i.e., means and standard deviations, odds 
ratios, effect sizes) and is able to transform the data into a standardized metric.  For each 
study, an effect size (d) was calculated using the reported means and standard deviations 
(Glass, McGaw, & Smith, 1981).  However, if the means and standard deviations were 
not reported in a study, other statistics were used to calculate d, for example F or t 
(Hedges & Olkin, 1985).  In studies providing multiple outcome measures, the results 
were pooled by weighting effect sizes to ensure each study contributes only one effect 
size (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Marín-Martinez & Sánchez-Meca, 1999).  An average of 
the effect estimates from each individual study was calculated by weighting each by its 
inverse variance.  As a result, a confidence interval was obtained (Sánchez-Meca & 
Marín-Martinez, 2008).  Positive effect sizes indicated studies in which judgment 
accuracy was shown to improve with experience, whereas negative effect sizes indicated 
studies reporting the opposite effect.  Zero effects indicated no statistically significant 
differences in judgment accuracy based on experience.  As in the Spengler et al. (2009) 
meta-analysis, zero effects were employed when it was not possible to calculate effect 
sizes from the statistical information given or when studies simply stated that the 
relationship between judgment accuracy and experience was not statistically significant.  
As Spengler et al. noted, this process produced a conservative estimate of the effect sizes, 
or a bias toward the null hypothesis; therefore, significant effort was made to contact the 
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authors of these studies to obtain the necessary statistical data.  Only one study resulted in 
the utilization of a zero effect conversion (Leon & Perez, 2001).   
The overall effect of the present meta-analysis based on a random effects model 
from 37 individual studies was .17, with a 95 percent confidence interval that was above 
zero (CI = .06 to .28).  Because the confidence interval did not include zero, it was 
possible to assume the effect was different from zero.  This overall effect indicated 
experience significantly impacted judgment accuracy, consistent with expectations.  
Table 2 provides a summary of the average weighted effect size estimates for the 
individual studies.  After removal of an outlier study, explained in the subsequent 
paragraph, the overall effect was .16, with a confidence interval of .05 to .26.  Removing 
the outlier study maintained the positive, small effect size with a confidence interval that 
was above zero, indicating judgment accuracy shows a slight improvement with 
experience. 
Homogeneity testing 
Hedges’ (1982) homogeneity statistic, Q, was used to assess the overall sample of 
studies in order to give support for testing moderator variables as well as identify possible 
outliers.  According to Hedges & Olkin (1985), Q is significant when the variability 
among the studies cannot be due to chance.  The Q statistic was sufficiently large to 
reject the null hypothesis regarding homogeneity of the effect size distribution, Q (36) = 
59.00, p = .009.  However, one outlier study was identified (Rerick, 1999) via the  
Extreme Studentized Deviate (ESD) method (Grubbs, 1969).  The ESD method allows 
for calculation of the maximum deviation from the mean value and subsequent 
comparison with a critical value.  If the maximum deviation is greater than the critical 
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value, the maximum deviation is then considered to be an outlier and considered for 
removal.  With the present effect size data, the ESD method revealed Rerick as an outlier 
study, with significance at the .05 level.  After reviewing the outlier study to ensure no 
inputting errors were committed upon inclusion into the meta-analysis program, it was 
decided that the study be removed due to its relatively large effect size (di+ = 1.86).  The 
Q statistic was still sufficiently large to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity after 
the outlier was removed, Q (35) = 52.37, p = .030.  The removal of the outlier study 
resulted in an overall experience-accuracy effect of .16, with a 95 percent confidence 
interval of .05 to .26.  Previously identified moderators were subsequently analyzed in 
order to gain a more precise understanding of the moderating effects of particular 
variables in relation to the experience-accuracy effect.  According to Huedo-Medina, 
Sánchez-Meca, Marín-Martínez, & Botella (2006), exploratory moderator analyses 
should be conducted when homogeneity testing reveals more heterogeneity that can be 
explained by chance.  In addition, moderator analyses were conducted to allow for a more 
in-depth comparison with the analyses in Spengler et al. (2009).  
Hypothesis testing 
Moderator variables were analyzed using Hedges and Olkin’s (1985) counterpart 
to the analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistic.  Moderators were chosen based on the 
Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis as well as additional moderators chosen based on a 
review of the clinical judgment literature.  Moderators included (a) experience type, (b) 
experience breadth, (c) judgment type, (d) criterion validity for accuracy dependent 
measure, (e) provision of feedback, (f) publication source, (g) ecological validity of the 
method of study, (h), ecological validity of stimulus, (i) relation of experience to the 
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research design, (j) experience as a major variable, (k) study quality, (l) profession type, 
(m) inclusion of non-mental health participants, and (n) publication year.  The following 
outlines the impact of moderator variables in relation to the experience-accuracy effect.  
For moderators categorized in multiple levels (i.e., analogue, archival, and in vivo), the 
between-class effect was used (QB) in addition to the reporting of the 95 percent 
confidence interval.  Continuous variables, however, were analyzed using Rosenthal’s 
(1991) focused comparison of effect size (z).  For categorical moderator variables in 
which fewer than 3 studies pertained to any particular category, that category was 
removed from the moderator analysis.  The limit of 3 studies per moderator category and 
the exclusion of those categories not meeting this requirement has been the methodology 
utilized in various meta-analyses (e.g., Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Hall, Coats, & Smith 
LeBeau, 2005; Hoeve et al., 2009) as well as recommended by meta-analysts (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001).  Table 2 displays the results of the main effects for each study and the 
effect sizes for the particular judgment type used.  Table 3 displays the categorical 
variable codes for each study.  Table 4 displays the results of the moderator analyses.  
Table 5 displays the corresponding stem-and-leaf plot. 
Experience type will not have a significant impact on the experience-
accuracy effect.  Experience type was comprised of three categories: clinical, 
educational, or both.  It was hypothesized that experience type would not have a 
moderating effect on judgment accuracy, which was found to be true, QB(2)  = .94, p = 
.627.   
Experience breadth will not have a significant impact on the experience-
accuracy effect.  Experience breadth could be coded as general, specific, or both.  The 
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experience-accuracy effect was not hypothesized to differ based upon experience breadth, 
which was found to be true, QB(2) = .63, p = .729. 
 Judgment type will have a significant impact on the experience-accuracy 
effect, with more experienced clinicians showing better accuracy in diagnosis, 
formulating treatment recommendations, and recalling problems.  Type of judgment 
made was categorized as problem type, hit rate, treatment, severity, prognosis, problem 
recall, other, or combined.  Consistent with expectations, the type of judgment made had 
a significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect, QB(3) = 8.27, p = .041.  More 
experienced clinicians were better at assessing clients’ problems (di+ = .29) and were 
more accurate in studies employing a combination of judgment tasks (di+ = .29).  
However, only one study was identified that involved clinicians making prognostic 
judgments.  Other types of judgments, such as treatment, severity prognosis, and problem 
recall were not interpretable due to none or too few of the included studies utilizing these 
specific types.  The findings of the present meta-analysis are comparable with those of 
the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, in which more experienced clinicians were 
found to perform significantly better on problem type judgment tasks.  In addition, the 
Spengler et al. meta-analysis found more experienced clinicians to be significantly better 
at forming appropriate treatment recommendations, accurately recalling client problems, 
and other judgment types.  
Criterion validity for the accuracy dependent measure will have a significant 
impact on the experience-accuracy effect, with more experienced clinicians 
outperforming less experienced clinicians when the judgment tasks reflect low 
criterion validity.  Criterion validity could be categorized as low, high, or both and 
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contrary to expectations, did not have a significant moderating effect on experience and 
judgment accuracy, QB(2) = 2.29, p = .318. 
Provision of feedback will not have a significant impact on the experience-
accuracy effect.  The provision of feedback was coded dichotomously as “yes” or “no” 
and did not reveal a significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect, as 
hypothesized, QB(1) = .02, p = .883.  However, only three studies were identified that 
incorporated feedback as part of the judgment task (Hickling et al., 2002; Kim & Ahn, 
2002; Wood, 2004). 
 Studies published in APA journals will reveal greater effects for experience 
and judgment accuracy than those in non-APA sources.  Publication sources were 
coded as APA, other psychology journal, psychiatric or medical journal, or dissertation.  
Consistent with expectations and the findings of Spengler et al. (2009), publication 
source had a significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect, QB(3) = 16.48, p = 
.001.  Studies published in APA journals reported the largest experience-accuracy effects 
(di+ = .54).  This phenomenon has been well-researched (Kurosawa, 1984; Light & 
Pillemer, 1984; Peters et al., 2006; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989) and has been explained 
in terms of the competitiveness of major journals such as APA journals and the 
subsequent tendencies of studies with larger effect sizes to be accepted for publication.  
In addition, studies published in psychiatric or medical journals included greater 
experience-accuracy effects (di+ = .23).  Finally, the experience-accuracy effects found in 
dissertations tended to be significantly larger as well (di+ = .16). 
 Ecological validity of method of study will not have a significant impact on 
the experience-accuracy effect.  Ecological validity of method of study was categorized 
Meta-analysis 86 
 
as analogue, archival, or in vivo.  As expected, there was no significant moderating effect 
of the relation between experience and judgment accuracy, QB(1) = .00, p = .989.   
Ecological validity of stimulus will not have a significant impact on the 
experience-accuracy effect.  Ecological validity of stimulus was categorized as directly 
experienced, indirectly experienced, or both.  As expected, ecological validity of stimulus 
did not have a significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect, QB(1) = .86, p = .353. 
Relation of experience to the research design will not have a significant 
impact on the experience-accuracy effect.  Relation of experience to the research 
design was categorized as not in design, in primary design, in supplementary analyses, 
and in multiple formats.  As expected, no significant moderating effect was found for this 
variable, QB(2) = 4.70, p = .095. 
Experience as a major variable will not have a significant impact on the 
experience-accuracy effect.  Experience as a major variable was coded dichotomously 
as “yes” or “no” and was not shown to significantly moderate the experience-accuracy 
effect, as expected, QB(1) = .02, p = .882.  Most studies cited research pertaining to the 
impact of experience on clinical judgment in the introduction sections and/or rationales.  
Also, many included hypotheses regarding the relation between experience and judgment 
accuracy.     
Study quality will not have a significant impact on the experience-accuracy 
effect.  Study quality was categorized as acceptable, good, or excellent and was not 
shown to make a significant impact on the relation between experience and judgment 
accuracy, QB(2) = .94, p = .625.  The majority of studies were coded as “good” and 
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reported adequate sampling methods, study design, and appropriate measures for 
establishing internal and external validity. 
No specific hypothesis was formed regarding the impact of profession type on 
the experience-accuracy effect.  Profession type was categorized as psychology, 
psychiatry, nursing, social work, or combination.  Profession type did not have a 
significant moderating impact on the experience-accuracy effect, QB(1) = 1.38, p = .239.  
The vast majority of mental health clinicians practiced in the field of psychology as 
opposed to psychiatry, nursing, or social work, with only one study examining the 
judgments of psychiatrists alone.  In fact, the categories of psychiatry, psychiatric 
nursing, and social work were not interpretable due to too few studies coded in these 
categories.  
Inclusion of non-mental health participants will have a significant impact on 
the experience-accuracy effect, with larger effects found within studies including 
comparisons between non-mental health participants and mental health clinicians.  
Inclusion of non-mental health participants was coded “yes” or “no” and did not reveal a 
statistically significant moderating effect, contrary to expectations, QB(1) = 2.37, p = 
.124.  
Publication year will have a significant impact on the experience-accuracy 
effect, with more recent studies showing larger experience-accuracy effects.  Study 
age was recorded as the year of publication and was not shown to have a statistically 
significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect, z = -.71, p = .476. 
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Fail-safe analysis 
As in Spengler et al. (2009), a “fail-safe” analysis was conducted to address the 
problem of publication bias (Rosenthal, 1991).  According to Rosenthal (1979), “journals 
are filled with the 5% of the studies that show Type I errors, while the file drawers back 
at the lab are filled with the 95% of the studies that show nonsignificant (e.g., p > .05) 
results” (p. 638).  Results revealed 79 studies with zero effects would be needed to 
decrease the overall experience-accuracy effect to a level of unreliability, for which the 
95 percent confidence interval would include zero.  In order to combat the problem of 
publication bias, every effort was made to locate a representative sample of studies via 
the standardized search process.  
  
Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
The present meta-analysis found an overall experience-accuracy effect of .16 after 
the removal of one outlier study, a small effect according to Cohen’s (1998) guidelines.  
The corresponding 95 percent confidence interval was above zero (.05 to .26), indicating 
there was a reliable difference in judgment accuracy as a function of experience.  In 
comparing the findings from the present meta-analysis to the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-
analysis, it was apparent that the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals 
overlapped significantly and that both were above zero.  In the present study, 
homogeneity testing revealed the null hypothesis of homogeneity of effect sizes was 
rejected.  However, an analysis of outliers revealed a study with a relatively large effect 
size (Rerick, 1999).  This outlier was removed for the overall analyses as well as the 
moderator analyses.  After removing this outlier the null hypothesis regarding 
homogeneity of the effect sizes was still rejected.  In order to provide a more in-depth 
analysis of the heterogeneity, exploratory moderator analyses were conducted (Eagly & 
Wood, 1994).  In addition, the moderator analyses allowed for further comparison of the 
present study’s findings with those of Spengler et al.’s meta-analysis. Spengler et al., in 
contrast, explored moderator variables despite achieving homogeneity of the effect size, 
enabling Spengler et al. to explore previously unexamined variables.   
Interpretation of the overall effect 
 Although the overall experience-accuracy effect in the present meta-analysis was 
small according to Cohen’s (1998) guidelines, the interpretation, meaning, and 
importance are relative to several factors dependent upon the reader.  Mental health 
clinicians, for example, may interpret the overall effect in various ways.  For example, 
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clinicians may feel satisfied that there was a positive, reliable experience-accuracy effect 
found, even though the effect was modest.  In light of the continued skepticism and 
critical stance towards the validity of clinical judgment (e.g., Lichtenberg, 2009; 
Lilienfeld, Lynn, & Lohr, 2003), as well as the ongoing debate over the utilization and 
benefits of statistical methods in comparison to unaided clinical judgment (see Ægisdóttir 
et al., 2006, for a meta-analytic review), it is expected that many mental health clinicians 
will welcome the positive finding.  Westen and Weinberger (2004), for example, 
expressed concern over the skepticism towards clinical judgment, stating clinicians 
themselves have become susceptible to what they call “clinicism” (p. 601) referring to the 
cynical attitude towards or negative stereotype of mental health clinicians.  Westen and 
Weinberger (2004) cited misunderstandings of the clinical-statistical literature as some of 
the causes for the skeptical attitude towards clinical judgment.  Although the overall 
effect found in the present study was positive and reliable, the strength of the relation 
between judgment accuracy and experience did not seem to reflect the lofty claims 
commonly made by many mental health clinicians regarding the positive effects of 
experience on their professional growth.  Many mental health clinicians take pride in 
their years of training and experience and frequently cite these as the main source of their 
skills and knowledge (Westen & Weinberger, 2005).  According to Jennings, Hanson, 
Skovholt, and Grier (2005), “The emphasis on hard work (e.g., thousands and thousands 
of hours) and motivation versus inborn characteristics suggests that we (i.e., mental 
health practitioners) too can become experts if we keep at this work” (p. 28).  
Unfortunately, this perspective may be somewhat naïve, especially when examined 
within the context of clinical judgment research that highlights the tendency for more 
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experienced clinicians to demonstrate more confidence, but not necessarily more 
accuracy or competence (e.g., Goldberg, 1959; Holsopple & Phelan, 1954; Oskamp, 
1965; Twaites, 1974).  In fact, Arkes et al. (1981) emphasized overconfidence as one of 
the main factors that hindered clinicians’ ability to learn from experience.  Mental health 
clinicians, therefore, may be humbled by the findings of the present meta-analysis as well 
as those of the Spengler et al. meta-analysis.  When considering the almost 40-year time 
span between the two meta-analyses (1970-2010), the small, stable experience-accuracy 
effect may be somewhat disappointing and surprising for some clinicians.   
 Individuals seeking mental health treatment, however, may also have varying 
reactions and may reach different conclusions regarding the small, positive experience-
accuracy effect that was found both in the present study and in Spengler et al. (2009).  In 
debates about the validity of clinical judgment, it is commonly cited that clients place a 
great deal of trust in their mental health providers and that this trust may or may not 
reflect the clinicians’ true competence levels (e.g., Garb, 1998).  As discussed in Spengler 
et al., individuals seeking mental health services may reevaluate the relative importance 
they place on obtaining ‘expert’ care in accordance with their immediate and long-term 
needs.  In other words, if individuals feel there are high-stakes decisions to be made, of 
which the clinicians will play a major role, they may be likely to choose more 
experienced clinicians even though the gains in judgment accuracy associated with 
experience may only be modest.  For instance, clients frequently require the assistance of 
mental health clinicians when they are involved in high-conflict custody cases 
(McCurley, Murphy, & Gould, 2005).  In these situations, the clinicians may play the role 
of custody evaluator, guardian ad litem, parenting coordinator, or mental health therapist 
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to name a few.  The choice in clinician, which is oftentimes determined by outside 
parties, can be integral for the outcome of the case.  Many judges rely heavily upon the 
assessments of the clinicians, especially due to the clinicians’ relatively greater time 
spent with the clients and greater familiarity with the clients’ situations (Galatzer-Levy & 
Kraus, 1990).  However, it should be noted that greater familiarity with the clients’ 
situations and greater time spent with the clients involved does not automatically result in 
clinicians making more accurate judgments.  In fact, child custody evaluators are among 
one of the most visible groups of mental health clinicians criticized for their perceived 
failure to adhere to scientifically-based methods and ethical codes (Tippins & Wittmann, 
2000).  Other high-stakes areas in which clients may place relatively greater importance 
in obtaining the services of an experienced clinician, regardless of the modest experience-
accuracy relation, include competency evaluations, divorce mediation, and expert 
testimony.  Whether or not clients accept the modest gain in judgment accuracy in 
relation to clinicians’ experience will most likely be driven by the clients’ perceptions of 
the consequences or payoff associated with the clinicians’ decisions. 
Interpretation of moderator variables 
In terms of the overall experience-accuracy effect, few significant moderating 
variables were discovered in the present meta-analysis, namely judgment type and 
publication source. None of the other moderators were found to be significant, including 
experience type, experience breadth, criterion validity, provision of feedback, method of 
study, validity of stimulus, relation of experience to the research design, experience as a 
major variable, study quality, profession type, and inclusion of non-mental health 
participants.  Considering the large number of moderator variables chosen for both 
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studies, it is noteworthy that so few were found to make a significant impact on the 
experience-accuracy effect.  Present findings revealed more experienced clinicians 
demonstrated more accurate judgments in studies involving a combination of judgment 
types.  Findings revealed more experienced clinicians were less accurate in their 
prognostic ratings; however, this effect was only based upon one study.   
Regarding judgment type, results of the present meta-analysis revealed more 
experienced clinicians demonstrated significantly better accuracy with problem type 
judgments, consistent with Spengler et al. (2009). However, the Spengler et al. meta-
analysis also revealed more experienced clinicians were shown to perform significantly 
better than less experienced clinicians on tasks for which they were required to formulate 
treatment recommendations, accurately recall clients’ problems, and on tasks categorized 
as “other.”  The problem type category included judgments of problem(s), diagnose(s), or 
symptom(s). These results suggest that experienced clinicians perform better when  
assessing clients’ problems when compared to novices.  It may be that the relatively 
explicit graduate and post-graduate training in assessing clients’ problems, as compared 
to other judgment tasks, give clinicians of at least a graduate-level education an 
advantage in problem type assessments.  According to Westen and Weinberger (2005), 
clinical training often emphasizes teaching diagnostic and assessment skills over skills 
related to the prediction of future client behavior and/or outcome.  They noted that even 
though clinicians make implicit predictions as part of their daily practice, assessments of 
clients’ problems make up the vast majority of clinical judgment tasks.  Moreover, 
practicing clinicians are often required to make problem type judgments, specifically 
diagnostic judgments, with adherence to previously specified, explicit criteria.  This type 
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of assessment frequently calls for reliance upon structured diagnostic measures as well as 
the sharing of that information with third parties, for example supervisors, insurance 
companies, and government funding agencies.  Moreover, experienced clinicians often 
come to understand and appreciate the very practical ramifications for lack of adherence 
to preselected criteria, for example difficulties in receiving third party reimbursement.  
According to Tetlock and Mitchell (2008), the impact of accountability on clinical 
judgment is often overlooked in clinical judgment research.  Tetlock and Mitchell argued 
that even those judgment processes purported to be implicit, for example underlying 
prejudices and cognitive heuristics, are often made implicit in situations where clinicians 
will be held accountable for their decisions.  In these situations, clinicians’ self-awareness 
is heightened and they pay more deliberate attention to outward manifestations of their 
judgment processes and beliefs.  In the case of underlying prejudices, Tetlock and 
Mitchell discussed the often ignored policy-related and legal ramifications that moderate 
the judgment processes and decisions of clinicians in actual practice settings.  In regards 
to the present study’s findings that experienced clinicians made more accurate problem 
type assessments, Tetlock’s (2000) perspective on accountability may contribute to an 
appropriate explanation.  It is likely that more experienced clinicians have had greater 
exposure to the professional ramifications and accountability underlying clinical 
judgment, and therefore more directly adhere to practice standards (Levant, 2005; 
Tetlock).      
An additional moderating variable of the present study’s experience-accuracy 
effect was publication source, which was categorized as APA journal, other psychology 
journal, psychiatric or medical journal, or dissertation.  Present findings, consistent with 
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those of Spengler et al. (2009), revealed publication source as a significant moderator 
variable.  The largest experience-accuracy effects were included in studies published in 
APA journals.  The examination of publication source has been preferred practice in 
meta-analysis due to the tendency of major journals, such as APA journals, to accept 
studies in which relatively larger, statistically significant results have been found.  Due to 
the competitive nature of these major journals and the tendency for studies accepted by 
them to reveal larger, statistically significant findings, meta-analysts must make efforts to 
seek out other sources for studies in order to provide the most accurate, unbiased 
assessment possible of the research base (Kurosawa, 1984; Light & Pillemer, 1984; 
Peters et al., 2006; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989).  The present meta-analysis findings 
revealed studies published in psychiatry or medical journals as well as dissertations 
displayed significant, positive experience-accuracy effects.  
 The present meta-analysis allowed for the examination of two previously 
unexamined moderator variables, profession type and inclusion of non-mental health 
participants.  Profession type referred to the type of mental health profession to which the 
participants belonged. The studies included in the present meta-analysis overwhelmingly 
utilized clinicians in psychology as opposed to clinicians of other mental health 
professions, with 25 of the original 37 studies incorporating clinicians in psychology.  
The second largest group included a combination of several mental health profession 
types, with a total of 7 studies in this category.  The treatment, severity, prognosis, and 
problem recall categories were not interpretable due to too few studies coded in these 
categories.  The paucity of studies involving other mental health professionals, such as 
psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, and social workers may have prevented the discovery of 
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a larger moderating effect for profession type.  Overall, profession type was not found to 
be a significant moderator.  
The second moderator added for the present meta-analysis, inclusion of non-
mental health participants, referred to whether or not studies incorporated a “zero mental 
health experience” condition by including comparisons of mental health participants with 
other groups, such as undergraduates and/or other professionals.  Studies were coded as 
“yes” if they allowed for examinations of judgment accuracy in undergraduates and/or 
other professionals as compared to mental health participants.  In contrast, studies were 
coded as “no” when all the participants were at least graduate-level clinicians in a mental 
health field.  This moderator was included in the present study in order to address the 
problem of restricted range of the experience variable, as discussed in Spengler et al. 
(2009) and other works (e.g., Lambert & Ogles, 2004; Lambert & Wertheimer, 1988).  In 
Spengler et al., the lowest level of experience in the experience-accuracy comparison was 
restricted to at least graduate-level in a mental health field.  The present study, in 
contrast, included undergraduates and other professionals in order to capture the lower 
end of the experience continuum.  This categorization was utilized due to the 
hypothesized initial gain in competency and judgment accuracy as a result of graduate-
level studies (Garb, 1998).  It should be noted that undergraduates and other professionals 
were included together in categorizing this particular moderator variable and that this 
introduced heterogeneity within the “zero-mental health experience” group.  Clearly, 
some types of professionals possess specific skills and receive training in areas that 
would aid them in clinical judgment accuracy tasks.  For example, police officers’ 
training in investigative techniques, lie detection, and criminal profiling may far 
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outweigh the training and experiences possessed by undergraduates and may even rival 
the training and experiences of mental health clinicians in regards to certain judgment 
tasks, especially those that are commonly conducted by forensic psychologists (Kocsis, 
2003).  Hazelwood, Ressler, Depue, and Douglas (1995), in regards to the task of 
criminal profiling, stated “no amount of education can replace the experience of having 
investigated crimes” (p. 119).  Particularly in the area of forensic psychology judgment, it 
is often difficult to determine which type of professions should demonstrate the best 
performance (Kocsis, 2003).  The overall effect was not shown to differ based upon this 
moderator variable.      
Other moderator analyses were under assessed (i.e., feedback) due to a scarcity of 
clinical judgment research examining these variables.  The provision of feedback and its 
potential moderating role on the experience-accuracy effect was understudied due to the 
presence of only three studies examining its impact.  This was comparable to the 
Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, in which only two studies were identified as 
including the provision of feedback as part of the research design.  Neither found 
feedback to be a significant moderating variable.  The lack of studies examining feedback 
and its relation with experience and/or judgment accuracy is puzzling, especially when 
the lack of feedback is often provided as one of the main reasons mental health clinicians 
do not adequately learn from experience (e.g., Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Garb, 1998; 
Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Lichtenberg, 1997; Slobogin, 2003).  As discussed previously, 
feedback can be beneficial in learning from experience under certain conditions, 
specifically when clinicians clearly understand what constitutes an incorrect response as 
well as when immediate, unambiguous, and consistent feedback is given upon each 
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incorrect response.  In the mental health field, these conditions are rarely met (Dawes, 
1994; Garb, 2005; Lichtenberg, 1997; Zeldow, 2009).  It could be argued, however, that 
clinicians do receive various types of feedback in actual practice.  For example, 
nonverbal cues (i.e., facial expression, posture) can often provide a great amount of 
feedback during therapy sessions.  In addition, clinicians often receive verbal feedback 
from clients and clients’ families.  Although oftentimes more indirect or covert, this 
naturalistic feedback provides almost a constant stream of information to the clinicians.  
The difficulty lies in sorting through and interpreting the feedback, however.  Since it has 
already been demonstrated that mental health clinicians are vulnerable to various 
cognitive heuristics and biases (e.g., Nisbett & Ross), it is likely these ‘shortcuts’ would 
also permeate the clinicians’ utilization of feedback.   
Another potential moderator not analyzed in the present meta-analysis included 
the utilization of test data for the judgment task.  The lack of studies including test data as 
part of the stimulus measure precluded the inclusion of this potential moderator in the 
present study as well as in Spengler et al. (2009).  In very few studies, clinicians were 
provided with test protocols as part of the stimulus measure.  In Garb and Boyle (2003), 
for example, neuropsychologists were provided with various neuropsychological test 
protocols and asked to provide ratings of neurological impairment.  In this particular 
study, the test protocols were based upon the average scores of community-dwelling 38- 
and 74-year olds.  None of the clinicians were found to make errors in judgments.  It 
appeared that the inclusion of test protocols greatly decreased the challenge level of the 
judgment task, so much so that Garb and Boyle were not able to complete intended 
supplementary analyses of differences in judgment accuracy based upon clinician 
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variables.  Due to the longstanding debate about, and continued research support for 
actuarial methods, it was disappointing and surprising that so few studies were found that 
included test data as part of the stimulus materials for the judgment tasks.  Test cutoff 
scores provide a relatively easy and familiar method of incorporating statistical methods 
(Bury & Bagby, 2002; Graham, Watts, & Timbrook, 1991; Stein et al., 1999).  As 
described in Ægisdóttir et al. (2006), test cutoff scores are often more readily available 
and easier to construct than are statistical formulas.  Given that some of the resistance 
towards statistical methods has been the complex nature of statistical formulas, it seems 
that clinicians would more readily assimilate test cutoff scores as a way to bridge the gap 
between unaided clinical judgment and pure statistical methods.  Due to the high stakes 
nature of many of the decisions clinicians are required to make (i.e., predicting suicide, 
estimating violent reoffense risk), even relatively small increases in judgment accuracy 
are often important. 
Implications of present findings 
 The present study’s findings have serious implications for the field of psychology 
in general, but especially for practicing clinicians.  The present meta-analysis was 
conducted in order to update and expand upon the Spengler et al. (2009) meta-analysis, 
addressing experience-accuracy research from 1997 to 2010.  Despite calls for better 
training in and greater focus on critical thinking skills and evidence-based practice, the 
present findings reveal little change in the direction and/or magnitude of study findings 
since the time period covered by Spengler et al., 1970 to 1996. Overall, the state of 
clinical judgment research seems to be remarkably similar to that of the time frame 
assessed in the Spengler et al. meta-analysis.  The same moderators Spengler et al. had 
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intended to assess but could not based upon lack of relevant research studies (e.g., 
feedback, expertness) likewise precluded assessment in the present meta-analysis.  
Although clinical judgment research continues to address the relation between judgment 
accuracy and experience, the methodology utilized and the moderators assessed in the 
studies have remained relatively constant.  Overall, the present study revealed remarkably 
similar findings as the Spengler et al. meta-analysis, in terms of the small, positive effect 
as well as the few impacting moderator variables discovered.  The present study sought to 
cross-validate and test the robustness of the Spengler et al. meta-analysis, and it seems 
the present findings largely replicated those of the former.  
 The present study findings have important implications for training in 
psychology.  Without a significantly large increase in judgment accuracy with greater 
experience (including educational), it will be difficult for training programs to justify the 
amount of time and resources utilized.  As was found by Harding (2007), it is quite 
possible that training programs are lacking in the explicit teaching of critical thinking and 
clinical judgment skills and that this deficit in training could hamper clinicians’ ability to 
learn from their experiences.  One way in which training programs may foster the 
development of critical thinking and sound clinical judgment skills is through explicit 
instruction of cognitive biases and heuristics (Kahneman, 2003).  The clinical judgment 
research continues to emphasize the role cognitive biases and heuristics play in clinical 
decision-making; however, further steps are needed to translate those results to inform 
actual practice and training programs.  For example, the newly defined affect heuristic 
(Slovic et al., 2002) addresses clinicians’ tendencies to utilize emotions and feeling states 
to guide judgment.  This type of heuristic has relevance for many types of clinical 
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decisions. Awareness and examination of the affect heuristic has the potential to aid 
future clinicians in maintaining a balanced, critical perspective. 
 Finally the present study findings provide further support for clinicians learning to 
work in tandem with technological and statistical aids, for example assisting clinicians in 
making suicide predictions based on statistical calculations (Gustafson, Greist, Stauss, 
Erdman, & Laughren, 1977).  Although the present study revealed an overall positive 
effect for experience and judgment accuracy, it is a smaller effect than what most would 
probably suspect or hope for, especially those who believe their years of experience have  
resulted in a significant increase in their abilities to make accurate decisions.  Mainstream 
journals, such as the Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research, Practice, Training, have printed special issues outlining specific 
technological developments in the field of psychology and how they are transforming 
clinical practice (Caspar, 2004).  One area in which statistical models are gaining 
popularity and utility is in the prediction of violence (Ægisdóttir et al., 2006).  It is likely 
that with the continued development of technological and statistical methods of clinical 
judgment, the positive effects of experience will be even more overshadowed (Grove et 
al., 2000; Monahan, Steadman, Silver, Appelbaum, & Robbins, 2001).  However, if 
clinicians can learn to work effectively with technological and statistical aids, clinical 
judgment may be greatly enhanced. 
Limitations of the present meta-analysis  
The results of the present meta-analysis should not be interpreted without an 
examination of the present study’s limitations.  First, the study search was initially 
conducted via review of titles and abstracts in comparison to the Spengler et al. (2009) 
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meta-analysis, in which many more full articles and/or dissertations were sought early in 
the search process.  When reviewing the titles and abstracts for the present meta-analysis, 
studies were screened first for inclusion of some type of clinical judgment task.  It is 
possible, therefore, that some studies allowing for experience-accuracy analyses may 
have been excluded.  If the studies included experience-accuracy examinations in 
supplemental or post-hoc analyses, it is logical that these studies may be prematurely 
excluded based upon the titles and abstracts not alluding to the experience-accuracy 
analyses.  In addition, forward and/or backward referencing was only conducted with the 
75 studies included in the Spengler et al. meta-analysis as well as the final 37 studies 
included in the present meta-analysis.  If forward and backward cross-referencing had 
occurred throughout the study search process, as in the Spengler et al. meta-analysis, it is 
possible that more relevant studies would be found.  However, it should be noted that the 
majority of the relevant studies found as a result of the forward and backward cross-
referencing had also been located initially through the database search process using the 
pre-selected search terms.  In order to account for possible missing studies as a result of 
the relatively more limited search process, a random effects model was chosen for the 
present study in comparison to the fixed effects model utilized in the Spengler et al. meta-
analysis.  The random effects model assumed between- as well as within-study 
variability.  In the Spengler et al. meta-analysis, the fixed effects model assumed 
variability only within each included study due to the assumption that there is one 
underlying effect.  Since it was reported in the Spengler et al. meta-analysis that every 
relevant study was included, the fixed effects model allowed for conditional inferences to 
be made upon the pool of selected studies. 
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Another limitation of the present meta-analysis related to the limited variability in 
the problem type moderator variable.  As noted previously in the discussion of important 
moderator findings, experienced clinicians were found to make significantly more 
accurate problem type judgments.  Problem type studies, such as Parmley (2006), often 
utilized case vignettes as the stimulus measure for the judgment task.  In Parmley, for 
example, clinicians were asked to read and provide diagnoses for two case vignettes 
describing clients with either a psychotic disorder or anxiety disorder.  Out of 37 
originally included studies in the present meta-analysis, 22 utilized case vignettes.  Case 
vignettes have been frequently employed in the clinical judgment research (e.g., 
Finlayson & Koocher, 1991; Kalichman & Craig, 1991; Warner-Rogers, Hansen, & 
Spieth, 1996; Zellman, 1990).  One benefit of utilizing the case vignette method is that it 
often allows the researcher to have greater control over the systematic manipulation of 
variables.  For example, vignettes may be constructed with strict adherence to DSM-IV-
TR criteria.  In addition, client variables, such as age, race, and problem type can easily 
be manipulated across the study’s conditions.  Although case vignettes potentially offer 
convenience and control for the researcher as well as a variety of other advantages, they 
are never able to capture or replicate real-life judgment tasks.  In actual clinical practice, 
clinicians are faced with a variety of confounding factors that may hinder their ability to 
make accurate client appraisals.  These potential obstacles may include clients’ 
tendencies to portray themselves in an overly positive or negative manner, family 
members’ subjective input regarding the clients’ problems, and third party demands for 
clinical performance (i.e., managed care requirements, company policies).   
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However well-constructed, case vignettes often neglect to account for these 
additional factors, transforming what is typically a ‘fuzzy’ decision-making task into a 
more manageable and simplified one (Hansen et al., 1997).  In the present meta-analysis, 
the abundance of case vignette studies resulted in an oversimplification of judgment 
tasks.  This restriction most likely prevented an examination of more difficult judgment 
tasks, such as those in which clinicians are asked to make judgments in vivo, including all 
naturally occurring confounds.  One study example of in vivo methods is Hannan et al. 
(2005), in which 48 therapists at a university outpatient clinic were asked to predict their 
clients’ progress and outcomes during a 3-week period, specifically whether or not they 
would drop out of treatment prematurely.  Hannan et al. found that only one clinician 
predicted accurately and that results did not differ based upon clinicians’ knowledge of 
client deterioration base rates.  As in Spengler et al. (2009), studies that incorporated in 
vivo methods of study were relatively rare.  It is possible, therefore, that the inclusion of 
so many case vignette studies where the judgment tasks were relatively simpler and more 
contrived inflated the overall experience-accuracy effect.  Alternatively, it is somewhat 
surprising that a larger experience-accuracy effect was not found due to the abundance of 
rather simplistic, straightforward judgment tasks. 
Overall, many of the moderator analyses had low power to detect potential 
moderating effects.  For example, in judgment type, four judgment types were excluded 
from the analysis due to having fewer than three studies in each category.  It seems the 
relative uniformity of judgment accuracy research, specifically the preponderance of 
analogue research utilizing case vignettes, prevented a thorough analysis of moderator 
variables.  It was extremely difficult to accurately gauge the impact of potential 
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moderator variables when so much of the research assessed the experience-accuracy 
relation in similar ways, oftentimes utilizing contrived situations in which participants are 
given a restricted amount of information.  The tendency of judgment accuracy studies to 
assess the experience-accuracy relation in similar ways, therefore, resulted in the 
exclusion of several moderator categories and even in the complete prevention of 
accurate assessments of particular moderator variables, for example the provision of 
feedback variable.  The problem of low power is common in meta-analyses, especially 
when assessing moderator variables across several categories (Lipsey & Wilson, 2003). 
Suggestions for future research 
 Future studies involving the experience-accuracy relation should attempt to create 
more precise guidelines for the operationalization of the experience variable.  The 
definitions of experience varied greatly from one study to the next.  In future studies, 
maintaining experience as a continuous variable will allow for more precise analyses of 
the experience-accuracy effect.  In some of the included studies, subjective categories 
were created based upon certain loosely defined variables related to experience (e.g., 
Witteman & van den Bercken, 2007).  For example, years of clinical experience was 
sometimes transformed into a categorical measure of experience and analyzed in terms of 
two levels (i.e., novice versus expert).  Although the creation of the two levels often 
relied upon straightforward cutoff criteria based on years of experience, researchers 
sometimes seemed to confound other variables of experience within the categories, such 
as degree type and level of training.  In future studies, researchers can address this 
challenge by creating more clear-cut guidelines for the experience variable. 
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 In addition, future researchers addressing the experience-accuracy effect may 
wish to employ participants from various subfields of mental health as well as non-
mental health participants.  Meta-analysts in the future will therefore be able to achieve a 
more comprehensive and accurate perspective on the moderating effects of profession 
type and the inclusion of non-mental health participants.  In order for this to occur, 
however, it will be necessary for researchers to report data for each subsample (e.g., 
social workers, undergraduates) instead of reporting data for the overall sample. 
 Finally, future researchers of the relation between experience and accuracy may 
wish to expand their study methods to incorporate those with varying degrees of 
ecological validity.  In the present meta-analysis, 22 out of 37 studies utilized clinical 
case vignettes to present judgment tasks to participants.  These vignettes were oftentimes 
constructed based upon rigid adherence to DSM-IV-TR criteria, thus decreasing the 
likelihood that participants would make incorrect responses or inaccurate judgments (e.g., 
Brammer, 2002).  Other studies employed relatively contrived situations in order to 
provide a standard for accuracy, which led to a decrease in the generalizability of the 
results (e.g., Garb, 2006; Ruscio & Stern, 2005).  According to Ruscio and Stern (2005), 
for example, “The judgment task in this research was the simplest holistic task that we 
could conceive, and the failure of participants to perform well under these conditions 
casts serious doubt on the efficacy of holistic judgment more broadly” (p. 62).  In real-
world practice, however, clinicians are often called upon to make “fuzzy” decisions for 
which the “correct” answer is difficult, if not impossible, to determine (Dawson et al., 
1989; Lichtenberg, 2009).  Future clinical judgment researchers may wish to explore a 
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variety of methods for examining judgment accuracy rather than relying on case vignettes 
for their clarity and standardized nature. 
 Future clinical judgment research should continue to critically examine the 
presence and role of feedback in learning from experience.  While it has often been stated 
that mental health clinicians are not able to learn from experience in part due to the lack 
of unambiguous feedback (e.g., Westen & Weinberger, 2005), it could also be said that 
mental health clinicians should be trained in sorting through and interpreting this specific 
type of ambiguous feedback.  Given the difficulties clinicians have had in establishing a 
direct, consistent relation between experience and improvements in accuracy and 
competence, it may be time to explore other methods of training as well as explore 
additional moderating and mediating variables. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the present meta-analysis found a small, but positive, reliable effect 
between experience and judgment accuracy, with judgment type and publication source 
as moderating factors.  The results of this meta-analysis are comparable to those found in 
Spengler et al. (2009) in which an examination of studies from 1970 to 1996 revealed a 
small, positive experience-accuracy effect.  Similar to the Spengler et al. meta-analysis, 
the results of the present meta-analysis revealed little impact of theoretically important 
variables (e.g., experience breadth, experience type) on the experience-accuracy effect.  
Given the limitations of the present study and the relatively smaller sample of studies, the 
fact that the findings of the present meta-analysis largely reflected the findings of the 
Spengler et al. meta-analysis is significant and noteworthy.  Although the meta-analyses 
spanned two separate time periods and included a distinct set of selected studies, it seems 
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the experience-accuracy effect remains a small, positive effect.  In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that the various moderator variables assessed only revealed a few significant 
effects in each meta-analysis, indicating the overall effect is relatively stable.  Although 
the present meta-analysis and the Spengler et al. meta-analysis utilized two different 
models (i.e., random, fixed), the overall effect sizes in each study were virtually identical.  
The results of the present meta-analysis are humbling given the popular belief and desire 
amongst professionals for a large, clear-cut payoff for training and experience.  These 
results provide support for critical examination of training programs in search of more 
effective methods of teaching sound clinical judgment and critical thinking skills as well 
as an empirically exploration of additional moderating and mediating variables.  In 
summation, given the findings of the present meta-analysis as well as those of Spengler et 
al., there needs to be a field-wide acknowledgement of the difficulties more experienced 
clinicians face in making accurate judgments as well as an emphasis on investigating the 
particular circumstances in which clinical judgment accuracy is shown to improve with 
experience. 
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Appendix A 
 
Electronic Data Base Search Terms 
 
Clinical [judg(e)ment(s)] [bias(es)] [judg(e)ment(al)(s) bias(es)] [decision(s) (making)] [judge(s)] 
[assessment(s)] [prediction(s)] 
Counselor [judg(e)ment(s)] [bias(es)] [judg(e)ment(al)(s) bias(es)] [decision(s) (making)] 
[assessment(s)] [prediction(s)] 
Medical [judg(e)ment(s)] [bias(es)] [judg(e)ment(al)(s) bias(es)] [decision(s) (making)] [judge(s)] 
[assessment(s)] [prediction(s)] 
Psychiatric [judg(e)ment(s)] [bias(es)] [judg(e)ment(al)(s) bias(es)] [decision(s) (making)] 
[judge(s)] [assessment(s)] [prediction(s)] 
Psychological assessment(s) 
Diagnostic [judg(e)ment(s) [decision(s) (making)] (accuracy) 
Treatment [judg(e)ment(s)] [decision(s) (making)] 
Intervention [judg(e)ment(s)] [decision(s) (making)] 
Judg(e)ment(al) [heuristic(s)] [bias(es)] (accuracy) 
Anchoring [heuristic(s)] [effect(s)] [bias(es)] 
Representative(ness) [heuristic(s)] [effect(s)] [bias(es)] 
Availability [heuristic(s)] [effect(s)] [bias(es)] 
Salience(y) [heuristic(s)] [effect(s)] [bias(es)] 
Vividness [heuristic(s)] [effect(s)] [bias(es)] 
Illusory correlation(s) 
Fundamental attribution error(s) 
(Diagnostic) (Treatment) overshadowing 
(Under)(Over)diagnosing 
(Gender) [Race(ial)] (Socioeconomic) (Age) bias 
(Sex)(Rac)ism 
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Appendix B 
 
Search Strategy Flowchart 
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Appendix C 
 
Moderator Coding Sheet 
 
Title:   
 
Author(s):   
 
JN:        VOL:          PGS:          PY: 
 
Accept:  Reject:   Unsure: 
 
Experience Type:  Clinical, Educational, Both 
Experience Breadth:  General, Specific, Both 
Judgment Type:  Problem Type, Hit Rate, Treatment, Severity, Prognosis, Problem 
Recall, Other, Combined 
Criterion Validity:  Low, High, Both 
Provision of Feedback:  Yes, No 
Publication Source:  APA, Other Psychology, Medical, Dissertation 
Method of Study:  Analogue, Archival, In Vivo 
Validity of Stimulus:  Direct, Indirect, Both 
Relation of Experience to Design:  Not in Design, In primary design, Supplementary, 
Multiple 
Experience Major Variable:  Yes, No 
Study Quality:  Acceptable, Good, Excellent 
Profession Type:  Psychology, Psychiatry, Psychiatric Nursing, Social Work, 
Combination 
Inclusion of Non-Mental Health Participants:  Yes, No 
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Appendix D 
 
Metric Coding Sheet 
 
Rater______________ Date_____________ Author(s): _______________________________ 
 
Year: __________ Journal: _________________________________________________ 
 
Independent Variable: ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ______________________________ 
 
Group 1 (name): ___________________ Group 2 (name): _______________________ 
 
Mean: _________  SD: _________  n: _______Mean: _________ SD: _________  n: ________ 
 
    Test: ___________ df error: ___________ 
 
    Test value: _________ df effect: ___________ 
 
    p-value:     _________ effect size: __________ 
 
Which judgment direction or category is more accurate? ___________ Can’t determine ______ 
 
   Your (the rater’s) confidence in rating of accuracy is  (   ) Low  (   ) High 
 
Dependent Variable: ______________________________ 
 
Group 1 (name): ________________________Group 2 (name): _________________________ 
 
Mean: _________  SD: _________  n: _______Mean: _________ SD: _________  n: ________ 
 
    Test: ___________ df error: ___________ 
 
    Test value: _________ df effect: ___________ 
 
    p-value:     _________ effect size: __________ 
 
Which judgment direction or category is more accurate? _____________ Can’t determine ______ 
 
   Your (the rater’s) confidence in rating of accuracy is  (   ) Low  (   ) High 
 
 
Subjects (specify): 
 
Global Rating Methods/Analyses:  1  2  3 
             POOR    ADEQUATE        EXCELLENT 
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Table 1 
Interrater Agreement for Moderator Coding Sheet 
Moderator Kappa Rating Level of Agreement 
Experience Type 
 
.74 Substantial Agreement 
 
Experience Breadth 
 
.71 Substantial Agreement 
 
Judgment Type 
 
.74 Substantial Agreement 
 
Criterion Validity 
 
.73 Substantial Agreement 
 
Provision of Feedback 
 
.84 Almost Perfect Agreement 
 
Publication Source 
 
.96 Almost Perfect Agreement 
Method of Study 
 
.88 Almost Perfect Agreement 
Validity of Stimulus 
 
.81 Almost Perfect Agreement 
Relation of Experience to Design 
 
.88 Almost Perfect Agreement 
Experience Major Variable 
 
.79 Substantial Agreement 
 
Study Quality 
 
.79 Substantial Agreement 
 
Profession Type 
 
.85 Almost Perfect Agreement 
Inclusion of Non-Mental Health Participants 
 
.96 Almost Perfect Agreement 
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Table 2 
Corrected Effect Sizes Between Experience and Accuracy 
Study n 
Study 
effect 
size 
(d)c 
Lower Upper 
Public-
ation  
Year 
Problem  
Type 
Hit  
Rate 
Treat
- 
ment 
Sever
- 
ity 
Prog
- 
nosis 
Problem 
Recall Other 
Comb- 
ined 
Akehurst 
et al. 
(2004) 
58 0.21 -0.75 1.17 2004       0.21  
Bolandb 
(2002) 239 -0.00 -0.26 0.25 2002       -0.00  
Brammer
b
 
(2002) 
138 0.81 0.45 1.18 2002 0.81        
Butteb 
(1998) 10 -0.17 -2.15 1.82 1998  -0.17       
Ebling & 
Levensonb 
(2003) 
101 -0.04 -0.64 0.56 2003        -0.04 
Ekman 
et al. 
(1999) 
627 -0.04 -0.39 0.30 1999       -0.04  
Garb 
(2006) 40 0.30 -0.48 1.08 2006       0.30  
Garb & 
Boyle 
(2003) 
25 0.00 -0.84 0.84 2003 0.00        
Gerbeb 
(2007) 168 0.53 0.24 0.82 2007 0.53        
Meta-analysis 153 
 
Study n Study 
effect 
Lower Upper Public-
ation  
Problem  
Type 
Hit  
Rate 
Treat
- 
Sever
- 
Prog
- 
Problem 
Recall 
Other Comb- 
ined 
Hannan 
et al. 
(2005) 
48 0.54 -1.25 2.33 2005        0.54 
Hansen 
et al.b 
(1997) 
210 0.33 -0.07 0.73 1997        0.33 
Hickling 
et al. 
(2002) 
6 0.00 -2.26 2.26 2002  0.00       
Hillman 
et al.b 
(1997) 
183 0.42 0.12 0.72 1997        0.42 
Huffaker
b
 (2008) 125 0.06 -0.30 0.42 2001 0.06        
Jackson 
et al. 
(2004) 
222 -0.11 -0.41 0.19 2004  -0.11       
Joppb 
(2001) 89 0.21 -0.22 0.64 2001 0.21        
Kellnerb 
(2001) 109 -0.03 -0.62 0.56 2001        -0.03 
Kim & 
Ahna 
(2002) 
20 -0.06 -1.01 0.89 2002  -0.06 
    
 
 
Kitamura
b
 
(1999) 
406 0.23 -0.28 0.74 1999  
     
0.23 
 
Kocsis 
(2003) 444 0.11 -0.41 0.62 2003       0.11  
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Study n Study 
effect 
Lower Upper Public-
ation  
Problem  
Type 
Hit  
Rate 
Treat
- 
Sever
- 
Prog
- 
Problem 
Recall 
Other Comb- 
ined 
Leon & 
Perezab 
(2001) 
132 0.00 -0.64 0.64 2001 0.00        
Lubman 
et al.b 
(2007) 
1230 0.16 -0.14 0.47 2007 0.16        
Parker  
et al.b 
(1999) 
299 0.78 -0.02 1.57 1999 0.78        
Parmleyb 
(2006) 102 0.15 -0.73 1.03 2006 0.15        
Persons 
& 
Bertagnolli 
(1999) 
38 0.72 0.02 1.43 1999 0.72        
Rerick 
(1999) 27 1.86 0.57 3.86 1999 1.86        
Rieffel 
(2005) 47 0.04 -0.55 0.64 2005 0.04        
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Study n Study 
effect 
Lower Upper Public-
ation  
Problem  
Type 
Hit  
Rate 
Treat
- 
Sever
- 
Prog
- 
Problem 
Recall 
Other Comb- 
ined 
Rodriguez
b
 
(2002) 
253 -0.33 -0.70 0.03 2002   -0.33      
Ruscio 
& Sternb 
(2005) 
124 -0.46 -0.91 -0.00 2005     -0.46    
Shumaker
b
 
(1999) 
204 0.45 -0.77 1.68 1999 0.45        
Strainb 
(2002) 52 -0.02 -0.58 0.54 2002 -0.02        
Walkerb 
(1999) 281 -0.06 -0.69 0.57 1999 -0.06        
Wilkinb 
(2001) 120 0.45 -0.14 1.04 2001  0.45       
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Study n Study 
effect 
Lower Upper Public-
ation  
Problem  
Type 
Hit  
Rate 
Treat
- 
Sever
- 
Prog
- 
Problem 
Recall 
Other Comb- 
ined 
Wittema
n & van 
den 
Bercken 
(2007) 
41 0.32 -0.46 1.11 2007  0.32 
    
  
Woodb 
(2004) 210 0.20 -0.37 0.78 2004 0.20        
Yeo 
 et al.b 
(2001) 
230 0.19 -0.19 0.57 2001 0.19        
Zozulab 
(2001) 27 -0.27 -1.77 1.22 2001  -0.27       
 
Overall n 
or d 
6685 0.16 0.04 0.27  5.59 0.22 -0.33  -0.46  0.81 1.22 
n of 
studies 37     17 7 1  1  6 5 
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Note. Overall d is the average of ds for studies as units of judgment accuracy corrected for sample size.  Between subjects designs are 
used in all studies. 
aZero effect is inferred. The study reports statistically non-significant results.   
bWhen effect size estimates were provided for multiple categories of a nominal variable and the same sample was used (e.g., clinical 
and educational experience), effect sizes were combined and reported as both or multiple categories. 
cCorrected for sample size 
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Table 3 
Categorical Variables for Study Coding 
Study A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Akehurst et 
al. (2004) 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 4 1 0 7 
Boland 
(2002) 3 3 1 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 4 2 6 7 
Brammer 
(2002) 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 
Butte 
(1998) 3 1 1 2 4 3 1 2 1 1 3 1 3 3 
Ebling & 
Levenson 
(2003) 
3 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4 3 
Ekman et 
al. 
(1999) 
3 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 6 
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Study A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Garb 
(2006) 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 0 3 
Garb & 
Boyle (2003) 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 0 
Gerbe 
(2007) 3 3 1 2 4 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 6 7 
Hannan et 
al. (2005) 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 0 3 
Hansen et 
al. 
(1997) 
2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 5 2 0 3 
Hickling et 
al. (2002) 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 2 5 0 
Hillman et 
al. 
(1997) 
2 2 3 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 0 6 
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Study A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Huffaker 
(2008) 3 3 1 2 4 1 1 4 1 3 1 2 3 7 
Jackson et 
al. (2004) 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 0 3 
Jopp 
(2001) 1 2 1 2 4 1 2 3 1 3 1 2 5 0 
Kellner 
(2001) 3 3 1 2 4 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 6 3 
Kim & 
Ahn (2002) 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 0 
Kitamura 
(1999) 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 6 
Kocsis 
(2003) 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 6 
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Study A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Leon & 
Perez (2001) 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 4 1 2 1 1 0 3 
Lubman et 
al. (2007) 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 2 5 1 0 6 
Parker 
et al. 
(1999) 
2 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 5 1 0 6 
Parmley 
(2006) 2 2 2 2 4 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 0 5 
Persons & 
Bertagnolli 
(1999) 
3 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 5 2 3 7 
Rerick 
(1999) 2 2 2 2 4 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 5 
Rieffel 
(2005) 1 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 6 0 
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Study A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Rodriguez 
(2002) 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 6 
Ruscio & 
Stern (2005) 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 4 1 2 1 1 0 7 
Shumaker 
(1999) 3 1 2 2 4 1 2 3 1 2 5 1 6 7 
Strain 
(2002) 3 1 2 2 4 1 2 2 1 2 5 2 3 3 
Walker 
(1999) 1 2 2 2 4 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 6 0 
Wilkin 
(2001) 2 1 2 2 4 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 6 
Witteman 
& van den 
Bercken 
(2007) 
1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 0 
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Study A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Wood 
(2004) 2 3 2 1 4 1 2 3 1 2 5 1 0 3 
Yeo 
et al. 
(2001) 
2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 0 6 
Zozula 
(2001) 2 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 3 
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Note. Categorical variables and codes: A-experience type (1 = clinical, 2 = educational, 3 = both), B-experience breadth (1 = general, 
2 = specific, 3 = both), C-accuracy criterion validity (1 = low, 2 = high, 3 = both), D-accuracy feedback (1 = yes, 2 = no), E-
publication source (1 = APA journal, 2 = other psychology journal 3 = psychiatry or medicine journal, 4 = dissertation), F-method of 
study (1 = analogue, 2 = archival, 3 = in vivo), G-ecology of stimulus presentation (1 = directly experience, 2 = indirectly experienced, 
3 = both), H-relation of experience to design (1 = not in design, 2 = in primary design, 3 = supplementary analysis, 4 = multiple), I- 
experience as a major variable (1 = yes, 2 = no), J-study quality (1 = acceptable, 2 = good, 3 = excellent), K-profession type (1 = 
psychology, 2 = psychiatry, 3 = nursing, 4 = social work, 5 = combination), L-inclusion of non-mental health participants (1 = yes, 2 = 
no), M-measure of clinical experience (0 = not applicable, 1 = number of clients, 2 = number of test administrations, 3 = time of 
counseling, 4 = job setting, 5 = other, 6 = multiple measures), and N-measure of educational experience (0 = not applicable, 1 = 
number of graduate courses, 2 = year of graduate training, 3 = level of training [master’s, doctoral, internship, postdoctoral], 4 = time 
of face-to-face supervision, 5 = training intervention, 6 = other, 7 = multiple measures).  
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Table 4 
Categorical Models for Overall Accuracy Effects with Outlier Removed 
Variable and 
levels Between-class effect (QB) k 
Mean weighted 
effect size (di+)a Lower Upper 
Experience Type 0.94         
Clinical   7 0.09 -0.21 0.40 
Educational   18 0.12 -0.03 0.27 
Both   11 0.23* 0.05 0.41 
Experience 
Breadth 0.63         
General   18 0.12 -0.04 0.28 
Specific   8 0.23* 0.01 0.46 
Both   10 0.15 -0.04 0.34 
Judgment Type 8.27*         
Problem type   16   0.29** 0.17 0.41 
Hit rate   7 0.02 -0.22 0.26 
Treatment   (1)  (-0.34) (-0.70)  (0.03) 
Severity   (0)     
Prognosis   (1) (-0.46*) (-0.91) (-0.00) 
Problem recall   (0)       
Other   6 0.05 -0.12 0.22 
Combined   5 0.29** 0.08 0.50 
Criterion 
Validity 2.29         
Low   18 0.20** 0.06 0.33 
High   15 0.05 -0.13 0.23 
Both   3 0.30 -0.06 0.66 
Provision of 
Feedback 0.02         
Yes   3 0.12 -0.43 0.66 
No   33 0.16** 0.05 0.27 
Publication 
Source     16.48**         
APA   3  0.54**  0.01  0.78 
Other psychology   15 -0.02 -0.16 0.12 
Medical   4 0.23* 0.01 0.45 
Dissertation    14 0.15* 0.03 0.30 
Ecological 
Validity of 
Method of Study 0.00         
Analogue   31 0.16** 0.04 0.27 
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Variable and 
levels Between-class effect (QB) k 
Mean weighted 
effect size (di+)a Lower Upper 
Archival   (2)  (0.15)  (-0.32)  (0.61) 
In vivo  3 0.17 -1.00 1.33 
Ecological 
Validity of 
Stimulus 0.86         
Direct   8 0.26* 0.02 0.51 
Indirect   27 0.13* 0.01 0.25 
Both   (1)  (0.00)  (-2.29)  (2.29) 
Relation of 
Experience to the 
Research Design 4.70         
Not in design   (2)  (0.11)  (-.69)  (0.3) 
In primary design   25 0.16* 0.04 0.28 
Supplementary   6 0.32** 0.08 0.56 
Multiple   3 -0.13 -0.45 0.20 
Experience as a 
Major Variable 0.02         
Yes   33 0.15** 0.05 0.26 
No   3 0.20 -0.39 0.79 
Study Quality 0.94         
Acceptable   11 0.20 -0.01 0.41 
Good   19 0.17* 0.03 0.32 
Excellent   6 0.04 -0.21 0.30 
Profession Type 1.38         
Psychology   24 0.12 -0.02 0.26 
Psychiatry   (1) (0.23) (-0.41) (0.87) 
Psychiatric 
Nursing   (2) (0.16) (-0.36) (0.59) 
Social Work   (2) (0.04) (-0.39) (0.46) 
Combination   7 0.30* 0.04 0.56 
Inclusion of Non-
Mental Health 
Participants 2.37         
Yes   15 0.06 -0.10 0.22 
No   21 0.22** 0.09 0.36 
         
*p < .05      
**p < .01      
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Table 5 
Stem-and-Leaf Plot of Combined Effect Sizes for Experience and Overall Accuracy Effects with 
Outlier Removed 
 
Effect Sizes (d) Summary Statistics 
Stem Leaf   
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
1.2 
1.1 
1.0 
.9 
 .8 
.7 
.6 
.5 
.4 
.3 
.2 
.1 
.0 
-.0 
-.1 
-.2 
-.3 
-.4 
 
6 (outlier removed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  
2,8 
 
3,4 
2,5,5 
0,2,3 
0,1,1,3 
1,5,6,9 
0,0,0,4,6 
0,2,3,4,4,6,6 
1,7 
7 
3 
6 
Maximum 0.81 
Quartile 3 0.33 
Median 0.13 
Quartile 1 
-0.04 
Minimum 
-0.46 
SD 0.30 
Mean (weighted for sample n) 0.16 
N 36 
*Proportion with positive sign 0.67 
  
